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Abstract 
Afghanistan: The Crossroads of Conflicting Regional Interests 
By 
Sabera Azizi 
Advisor: Zachary Shirkey 
Despite 45 years of conflict, violence still thrives unwaveringly in Afghanistan. In a war 
charged with ambitious domestic actors and destructive regional states, peace is nowhere in sight 
in Afghanistan. The interaction between the actors of a conflict play a significant role in shaping 
the course of a war. Likewise, the interaction between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s regional 
states play an important role in intensifying the war. How are regional actors emboldening the 
Taliban? What roles do hostile regional states play in the Afghan war? This paper answers these 
questions by unprecedentedly identifying and examining all of the regional states that have been 
playing a destructive role in the war in Afghanistan.  
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Introduction 
Muhammad Iqbal, a renowned Pakistani poet, referred to Asia as “A body of water and 
clay, of which the Afghan nation forms the heart.”1  Historians too refer to Afghanistan as the heart 
of Asia due to its location. Although its location is glorified in literature, in reality, Afghanistan’s 
location has been a curse to its stability. As a small country nearly the size of Texas, Afghanistan 
has six neighbors. It’s strategic location near India, China, Russia, and Iran, has turned it into a 
battleground for regional conflicts and power competitions.  
 The war in Afghanistan is a very complex and multifaceted intrastate war. There are 
various domestic and external factors that have contributed to the ongoing 45-years conflict. 
Mainly, there are two factors that has inhibited peace in Afghanistan. Firstly, the zero-sum game 
between Afghanistan’s ruling elites have intensified the conflict. Secondly, the negative 
intervention by regional states have been prolonging the war.  
Due to the complex multi-party dynamics of the war in Afghanistan, there are many 
ambiguities and misconceptions within political conversations that cloud the reality in 
Afghanistan. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the Afghan war. This paper seeks to 
identify and explain the destabilizing roles that regional actors play in the war by utilizing 
academic research and empirical evidence.  
This paper is an important contribution to the political conversations on the war in 
Afghanistan because it’s a one-of-a-kind analysis that examines the destabilizing roles of the main 
regional players collectively. For academics, this paper enriches the academic literature on the  
                                                
1 Muhammad Iqbal, A message from the East: A translation of Iqbal's Payam-i Mashriq into English 
verse,( Lahore, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1977). 
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intervention of external states in intrastate conflicts. For political analysts and policy makers, this 
paper will pave the path to shift the discourse on the war in Afghanistan closer to the realities on 
the ground.  
 Furthermore, this paper begins with a general overview of the academic literature on the 
roles of external states in intrastate conflicts. Then, this paper provides an overview of 
Afghanistan’s ongoing 45-years of conflict, leading to an analysis of the destabilizing roles that 
regional players have on current conflict. Using academic theories discussed in the earlier part of 
the paper, along with empirical evidences, this paper will identify and explain the destabilizing 
roles that regional players have been exerting in the Afghan war. Finally, this paper will conclude 
by providing recommendations to policy makers on effective ways to gear towards a path of 
stability and peace in Afghanistan.   
 
The Debate 
The earlier academic literature on intrastate conflicts defined civil wars as a two-party 
conflict between a government and a rebel group. However, David Cunningham accurately notes 
that, “Intrastate conflicts are not always a ‘two-actor-phenomena,’ such approach would limit our 
ability to understand the dynamics of’ a conflict.” 2 The tendency to simplify the nature of intrastate 
conflicts fail to capture the nuances of most contemporary civil wars because extrinsic factors 
greatly impact the dynamics of intrastate conflicts.  
One of the significant extrinsic factors that effect an intrastate conflict is the support that 
external states give to the main actors of an intrastate conflict. Academic research has 
                                                
2 David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration”, (Bloomington, Midwest Political Science 





	   	  
demonstrated that external actors intervene in an intrastate conflict to either end a conflict or to 
exacerbate it by providing support to a main actor of the conflict.3 In that regards, civil wars are 
complex intrastate conflicts in which the main actors tend to be a government and a rebel group, 
but external actors play a key role in effecting the severity, duration, and outcome of the war. 
However, the roles of external actors in conflicts are not monolithic. The degree of impact that 
external actors have on a conflict is dependent upon the interests of the external actors that are at 
stake and the extent of influence that the external actors have on the main actors of an intrastate 
conflict.  
External states intervene in an intrastate conflict for several reasons. Foremost, external 
states intervene in an intrastate conflict when its interests can be attained by exacerbating a conflict. 
Another academic research suggest that states intervene on the basis of humanitarian grounds to 
protect mass atrocities against civilians.4 Further academic research indicates that neighboring 
regional states intervene in a civil war to prevent the conflict from spilling over to the borders of 
the neighboring states and to safeguard the stability of an entire region.5 Nonetheless, the overall 
academic literature confirms Balch-Lindsay and Enterline’s observation that, “Whether on the 
grounds of benevolent or malevolent reasons”, an external state’s intervention in a civil war is 
always strategic.6 
                                                
3 Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War 
Duration, 1820-1992” (Hoboken, Wiley, 2000).   Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “Why Are 
There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict” (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000).   Patrick M. Regan, “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate 
Conflicts” (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2002).  
4 J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, “Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas”, (Cambridge, Cambrdige University Press, 2003). 
5 Jacob Kathman, “Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention”, (Thousand Oaks, 
Sage Publications, 2011).  
6 Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time”    
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Furthermore, the support of external states is critical to the survivability of weak domestic 
actors. In particular, the support of external states to relatively weak domestic actors or to the main 
actors of a conflict that lack popular support play a significant role in fueling a conflict. If an 
insurgency lacks popular support, the assistance of an external state is crucial for the insurgent to 
sustain its insurgency.  External states that support domestic rebel groups do so because it’s cost-
efficient. Idean Salehyan’s research indicates that external states support domestic rebel groups at 
the cost of weakening its rival government because its less costly than directing engaging with its 
rival.7 
In intrastate conflicts, external states tend to be veto players or third-party actors.  
According to Cunningham, there are three characteristics that make an actor a veto player.8 
Foremost, veto players are actors that have the ability to unilaterally run a war. Secondly, the 
interests of a veto player conflicts with the interests of at least one of the main actors in a conflict. 
Lastly, veto players are internally strong and cohesive to effectively maintain its position 
throughout a conflict. In intrastate conflicts, external veto players tend to have pervasive authority 
over one of the main domestic actors. If an external veto player is present in a civil war, it is likely 
that one of the main domestic actors of the conflict is entirely dependent on the veto player to 
continue the war.  
Moreover, third-party actors are players that are not the main actors of a conflict but 
indirectly play an important role in shaping the course of a conflict. Although third-party actors 
are not directly involved in the warfare, their role is significant as “Actions and support from third 
parties can strongly influence the relative strength and expectations of the main conflict 
                                                
7 Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations”, (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 
2010).  
8 David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration”, (Bloomington, Midwest Political 
Science Association, 2006).  
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protagonists, and often shape the outcome of conflict process.” 9 A third party actor utilizes the 
momentum of a conflict as a means to further its interests. Unlike veto players, third-party actors 
do not have the means to unilaterally continue a conflict. However, third-party actors have the 
capability of escalating a conflict by supporting a main actor within in a conflict. Dylan Balch-
Lindsay’s and Andrew J. Enterline’s research proves that, “Third-parties are critical to the 
evolution of civil wars because they offer domestic opponents engaged in the conflict the 
opportunity to garner new resources, thereby altering the probability of victory for each of the 
sides.” 10 
In light of the literature on intrastate conflicts, this paper hypothesizes that the support that 
regional states give to the Taliban exacerbates and lengthens the current conflict in Afghanistan.  
The support that regional countries give to the Taliban is critical to the Taliban’s insurgency. As 
the Taliban lacks popular support, the Taliban is reliant on the sponsorship of regional states to 
continue the war. This paper applies the theories on external state intervention to the conflict in 
Afghanistan by examining the role of five regional states as case studies.  
 
Afghanistan’s Conflicts 
War has been plaguing Afghan society for nearly forty-five years. The current phase of the 
conflict in Afghanistan is a continuation of a series of conflicts initiated in 1973.  
 Since 1973, the war in Afghanistan can be divided into six phases: 
   Phase 1 à Mohammad Daud’s Regime (1973-1978)  
   Phase 2 à Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) 
                                                
9 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Kyle Beardsley, “Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central American 
Conflicts”, (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2004) 379.   
10 Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, Killing Time,624.  
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   Phase 3 à Post-Soviet Withdrawal ( 1989-1992)  
   Phase 4 à Mujdahideen Conflict ( 1992-1996) 
   Phase 5 à Taliban Movement ( 1996-2001) 
   Phase 6 à Second Taliban Movement (2001- Present) 
In each phase of the conflict, Afghan actors were supported by various foreign powers. Yet, the 
two constant factors that has prompted the participation of regional powers in the Afghan wars are 
Afghanistan’s strategic location and its natural resources.  
Phase 1: Mohammad Daud’s Regime (1973-1978) 
 
In 1973, as Mohammad Zahir Shah, Afghanistan’s king, was in Europe for medical 
treatment, Mohammad Daud, his cousin, overthrew the Afghan monarchy and established the 
Republic of Afghanistan.11 With the help of communist Afghan military officials, Daud 
successfully carried out a bloodless coup and declared himself the first president of the republic.12 
As a reward to the communists that supported his coup, Daud appointed them in key positions 
within his newly formed government.  
 However, Daud’s newly established government was met with backlash by Islamists who 
opposed the overwhelming influence of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 
Afghan communist party, within his government.13 Islamists, notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and 
Ahmad Shah Massoud, fled to neighboring Pakistan and were militarily trained under Zulfikar Ali 
                                                
11 J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, (Honolulu, University Press 
of the Pacific, 2002). 102-104	  
12 Kevin Baker, War in Afghanistan: A Short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the 
North-West Frontier 1839-201, (Kenthurst, Rosenberg Publishing, 2011) 156-160.  
13 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, (Stanford, Hoover 
Institution Press, 1983) 1-51. 
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Bhutto’s watch.14 For Pakistan, these Islamists were trained to carry out small-sized attacks to 
deter Daud from pursuing a tough foreign policy against Pakistan.15 However, for the Afghan 
Islamists, the attacks were aimed to trigger a nation-wide revolution against Daud’s regime in an 
attempt to establish an Islamic government.  
 
Phase 2: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) 
 
 In 1978, with the help of the Soviet Union, members of the PDPA overthrew Daud’s regime 
and Nur Mohammad Taraki, a member of the PDPA, was installed as the president of 
Afghanistan.16  Nearly a year later, the bitterness of the Islamists continued to build-up against the 
government in Kabul when Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s successor and a member of the PDPA, came 
to power.17 
 On December 25, 1979, as the Soviet Union crossed the Amu Darya into Afghanistan, 
Afghan Islamists continued to flee to Pakistan. Two days later, on the occasion of Babrak Karmal’s 
installation as the next president of Afghanistan, thousands of anti-government figures fled to 
Pakistan. 
 In Pakistan, the Islamist received training. These Islamists formed the Mujahideen, a group 
dedicated to fighting against the Soviet incursion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-installed 
government in Kabul. The Mujahideen was heavily armed and well-financed by the United States 
                                                
14 Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89, (Washington D.C., 
Brookings Institution Press, 2014)45-47. 
15 Elisabeth Leake, The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 
1936-1965, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016) 247-249.  
16 Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, ( New York City, Harper Perennial)1-
86.  
17 Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, 79-98. 
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and Saudi Arabia.18 As a result of the Mujahideen’s long-fought campaign against the Soviet 
Union and the PDPA, the Soviets withdrew in 1989.19 
 
Phase 3: Post-Soviet Withdrawal (1989-1992) 
  
Ten years of intrastate conflict between the Mujdahideen and the PDPA dwindled when  
the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. However, a relatively less-intense conflict ensued 
between the PDPA and the Mujdahideen as Mohammad Najibullah, a Soviet-backed president, 
was in power. 20 
As the Kremlin’s funding for Najibullah’s regime decreased, Najibullah’s government 
weakened. As a result, members of Najibullah’s government shifted their allegiance to different 
factions of the Mujahideen. Subsequently, the tension between the Mujahideen factions intensified 
as former communist-foes entered the ranks of the Mujahideen.   
By 1992, Najibullah’s regime collapsed and various factions of the Mujdahideen made 
significant inroads into Afghanistan, each controlling large chunks of Afghanistan’s territory. As 
each faction of the Mujahideen believed that their respective faction deserved the presidency, the 
political climate was ripe for another phase of intense intrastate fighting.  
 
Phase 4: Mujahideen Conflict (1992-1996) 
 
                                                
18 Feifer, The Great Gamble, 120-151. 
19 Feifer, The Great Gamble,218-255. 
20 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 3-14. 
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Although an interim government was established by consensus amongst the leaders of the 
Mujahideen, most of them failed to abide by the agreement. On April 25, 1992, intense fighting 
broke out between the  Mujahideen factions as Hizb-e-Islami Hekmatyar, a Mujdahideen faction, 
entered Kabul with forty tanks.21 The factions were backed by regional powers, seeking their 
geopolitical interests in Afghanistan via the Mujahideen factions.  
In the subsequent four years, conflict between the factions intensified, displacing over half 
a million civilians. 22  According to Ahmed Rashid, a journalist and an expert on Afghanistan, the 
Mujahideen’s infighting left Afghanistan in a “State of virtual disintegration… the country was 
divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides, and fought again in 
a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals, and bloodsheds.” 23 As a result, the local Afghan 
population became disenchanted with the Mujahideen. In 1996, as the Taliban made significant 
inroads into Afghanistan promising peace and stability, Afghans welcomed the Taliban leadership.  
 
Phase 5: Taliban Movement (1996-2001) 
 
On December 25,1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  During the ten years of 
Soviet occupation, the Soviets carried out indiscriminate attacks, carpet-bombing heavily 
populated districts in an attempt to suppress the population from rebelling against the government 
in Kabul. 24 The Soviet war in Afghanistan resulted in 1.5 million civilian deaths and 
                                                
21 Ibid,483-517. 
22 “Blood-Stained Hands Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity” (United States 
of America, Human Rights Watch, 2005) 
23 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central,(New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2010)21. 
24 J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University, 1986), 143-151. 
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approximately five million Afghans fled to neighboring countries. Of these five million Afghans, 
three million fled to Pakistan to escape the horrific effects of the war. 25 
In the refugee camps in Pakistan, Afghan boys, mostly orphans, studied in Saudi-sponsored 
madrassas. According to Peter Tomsen, former special U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan, the teachers of 
these students “Were clerics from radical Muslim parties in Pakistan.”26 These madrassas weren’t 
built for scholarship rather, it was designed to advance the political agenda of Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia.27 In these madrassas, students learned political values that were sympathetic to 
Wahabbism and Deobandism. Furthermore, according to a U.S. intelligence information report, 
“The mullahs convince these young boys at the madrasas to go to war and fight this holy jihad [in 
the 1990s].”28 The madrassas built the Taliban’s political and theological foundation and the 
students in these madrassas constituted the first wave of  Taliban fighters entering Afghanistan 
from Pakistan.  
Militarily, members of the Taliban received 15-29 days of training in Kandahar and Herat 
(strategic provinces in Afghanistan). The Taliban were supported by the Frontier Corps, a branch 
of Pakistan’s military, and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency. 
The Frontier-Corps were heavily involved in the Taliban’s combat operations. According to a U.S. 
intelligence information report, “These frontier corps elements [were] utilized in command and 
control; training; and when necessary combat.” 29  
On November 4, 1994, the Taliban made its first inroad into Afghanistan via Kandahar. A 
day later, the Taliban swiftly gained control over Kandahar due to the anarchic environment in the 
                                                
25 Marek Sliwinski, “Geneva researcher documents. Soviet genocide in Afghanistan”, (Leesburg, Executive 
Intelligence Review, 1988) 
26 Peter Tomsen, "PBS Frontline Interview: Taliban," 2006. 
27  Rashid, Taliban,88-90. 




	   	  
province. According to Rashid, the security in Kandahar was such that “International aid agencies 
were fearful of even working in Kandahar as the city itself was divided by warring 
groups…warlords seized homes and farms, threw out their occupants and handed them over to 
their supporters. The commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys 
for sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.”30 
Such anarchy in Kandahar led the local Afghan population to initially embrace the Taliban’s 
movement and its reign over Kandahar. The Taliban’s stable rule over Kandahar enabled it to 
expand its influence to neighboring provinces by promising to bring peace and stability to the other 
war-ridden provinces.  
Nearly three weeks after the Taliban controlled Kandahar, on November 25, 1994, the 
Taliban advanced eastwards and seized Helmand. Three months later, the Taliban made further 
gains by controlling Wardak and Logar. By the end of 1995, the Taliban controlled significant 
parts of Afghanistan’s southern and western provinces.  
The following year, on April 4, 1996, the Taliban declared jihad against the Mujahideen 
government in Kabul. A month later, on May 1996, Osama Bin Laden settled in Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan.31 The Taliban enabled bin Laden and Al Qaeda to use Afghanistan as a base for their 
operations. On September 26, 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul. As the Mujadahidden’s 
government crumbled, the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) became the 
main domestic force that resisted the Taliban’s incursion of Afghanistan.32  
For the next five years, from 1996-2001, heavy fighting ensued between the Taliban and 
the UIFSA. The conflict between these two groups created an “Unprecedented polarization in the 
                                                
30 Rashid, Taliban,21. 




	   	  
region.”33  The region was starkly divided between pro-Taliban states and anti-Taliban states. The 
Taliban was backed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, whereas the UIFSA was backed by Iran, Russia, 
Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.  
By 2001, the Taliban controlled nearly 90% of Afghanistan.  However, on that year, 
Afghanistan’s political landscape changed significantly. On September 11, Al Qaeda carried out 
attacks against the United States. Subsequently, the Bush administration requested the Taliban to 
surrender Bin Laden to the international community. However, the Taliban refused to hand over 
bin Laden. The Taliban’s refusal led Washington to assist the UIFSA to topple the Taliban’s 
regime.  
On October 7, 2001, the U.S.-led coalition began Operation Enduring Freedom by carrying 
out airstrikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As American airstrikes intensified, 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda fled to neighboring Pakistan.  Tomsen notes that “The Taliban leadership 
returned to their old sanctuaries in Pakistan. Bin Laden crossed into Pakistan with his wives, 
children, and long lines of armed al-Qaeda fighters disappeared from view. ”34 In 2002, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb-I-Islami Hekmatyar, declared a holy war against the United States and 
fled to Pakistan from Iran. 
           On November 25th, 2001, the Taliban’s reign over Afghanistan came to an end as the UIFSA 
gained control over Kunduz, the Taliban’s last stronghold. Nearly a month after the fall of Kunduz, 
on December 22, Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the chairman of the Afghan interim government.  
 
Phase 6: Second Taliban Movement (2001- Present) 
 
                                                
33Rashid, Taliban, 5.  
34 Tomsen, Wars of Afghanistan, 592. 
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Subsequent to the end of the Taliban’s regime, the International community backed Hamid 
Karzai as the head of the new interim government.  As Afghanistan started to reconstruct its 
society, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assisted the Afghan government in 
maintaining security and rebuilding its security institutions.    
After Karzai led the interim government for nearly three years, on November 3rd, 2004, he 
was elected as the first president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Nearly a month later, on 
December 7, 2004, Karzai was sworn into office. In his inaugural address, Karzai expressed his 
commitment to transform a war-ridden Afghanistan to a prosperous Afghanistan. Many Afghans 
and members of the international community were optimistic that a peaceful Afghanistan would 
soon come to be. Merajuddin Patan, the governor of Khost province, told the Washington Post 
that, “This is the birth of our nation… I believe the real history of Afghanistan – modern history – 
will begin with this.” Similarly, on Karzai’s inauguration day, Richard Bruce Cheney, former U.S. 
vice-president, said at a news conference that, “We gather to mark a historic moment in the life of 
the nation and in the history of human freedom.” Cheney concluded that “The tyranny is gone, the 
terrorist enemy is scattered and the people of Afghanistan are free.”35 However, the optimism that 
aroused from Karzai’s inauguration was short-lived because the Taliban’s insurgency started to 
gain momentum.  
On the same year of Karzai’s inauguration as president, the Taliban started using suicide 
attacks regularly against the Afghan government and the international-coalition forces. A year 
later, in 2005, Hekmatyar, started taking responsibility “For bombings, ambushes, and 
assassinations in Konar, Nuristan, Baghlan, and Kunduz provinces of Afghanistan.”36 The 
                                                
35 John Lancaster, “At Inauguration, Karzai Vows Action On Tough Issues”, (Washington D.C. 
Washington Post, 2004. 
36 Tomsen, Wars of Afghanistan, 592-597. 
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resurgence in violence was due to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban.  Tomsen indicates that, 
“From about early 2002 into 2003, the ISI organized three fronts to conduct offensive operations 
into Afghanistan from protected sanctuaries in Pakistan.”37 With Pakistan’s guidance and 
expertise,  the Taliban carried out its operations in Afghanistan.   
     On September 29, 2016, Hekmatyar signed a peace deal with Kabul, vowing to abandon his 
insurgency and embrace peace. Hekmatyar’s renouncement of violence marked a milestone in the 
current 17-years conflict as he was first insurgent leader to reconcile with the Afghan government. 
At that time, most political analysts were optimistic that the Taliban would follow Hekmatyar’s 
steps and make peace with Kabul too.  However, Hekmatyar’s reconciliation with Kabul didn’t 
trigger the desired domino-effect that would have induced other insurgent groups to embrace 
peace. Rather, the Taliban continued its insurgency.  
      Till date, the Taliban continues to carry out deadly attacks, causing significant surges in 
civilian causalities. Despite the resilient efforts of Kabul and the international community, the 
Taliban are still strong. Today, the Taliban threatens nearly 70% of Afghanistan’s territory, the 
most since the fall of its regime.  
 
The Actors in Current Phase of the Afghan War 
Defining the current war 
          The current conflict in Afghanistan is mainly an intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflicts are 
armed conflicts that are fought within the borders of a sovereign state and typically involve the 
“Active participation of the national government and effective resistance by both sides.” 38 
                                                
37 Ibid,593. 
38  Melvin Small and Joe Stinger, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, (Thousand 
Oaks, Sage Publications,1982) 210. 
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Likewise, in the current war, Afghanistan is the battleground where the main actors are Afghans 
that are backed by foreign powers.39  
Identifying the Main Actors 
Specifically, the main actors of the current phase of the conflict are the Taliban along with the pro-
Taliban forces against the Anti-Taliban forces:  
 
Main anti-government actors Main pro-government actors 
•   Taliban 
•   Groups that assist the Taliban: 
Ø   Drug traffickers 
Ø   Regional sponsors of the Taliban 
Ø   Warlords 
Ø   Rogue elements within the Afghan 
government 
 
•   Afghan government 
•   International Community 
 
 
As the chart above depicts, the main-anti government forces are the Taliban and the pro-
Taliban forces. The Taliban are regularly assisted by local drug traffickers and warlords to carry 
out their operations.40 Moreover, rogue elements within the Afghan government are complicit in 
abetting the Taliban carry out deadly attacks against civilians and political opponents. Ghulam 
Hussain Nasir, a member of the Afghan parliament said, “Suicide bombers are being transferred 
                                                
39 Anisa Shaheed, Sayyaf Urges Crackdown On ‘Agents Within The System,’ (Kabul, Tolo News, 2017).  
40 Ben Farmer, “Afghan drug lord who funded Taliban faces jail” (London, the Telegraph, 2012).  
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with the help of circles within the government which is a serious concern.”41 These rogue elements 
assist the Taliban to bypass security checkpoints inside Afghanistan, transport the Taliban’s 
weapons, and leak sensitive information to the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the local population refer 
to these rogue elements inside the government as the “Taliban that wear suits” and the “fifth pillar.”  
Furthermore, there are elements within the Afghan government that receive bribes to assist the 
Taliban to carry out attacks against the Afghan government.42 The Taliban bribes political officials 
to obtain governmental resources such as vehicles, gas and, weapons.43 At other instances, security 
officials receive bribes from the Taliban to leave their posts, thereby increasing insecurity.44 Such 
rogue elements have also been accused of releasing  anti-government actors from jail.45  These 
rogue elements within the Afghan government that assist the Taliban continue to play a key role 
in enabling the Taliban to carry out large-scale attacks.  
 Furthermore, the regional countries that assist and strengthen the Taliban’s ability to carry 
out attacks play a significant factor in lengthening the intrastate conflict in Afghanistan. In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban are supported by Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China. 
Although these regional countries maintain official ties with the government in Kabul, these 
regional states also maintain covert ties with the Taliban. These regional countries use covert and 
official channels as a means to effectively advance their respective national interests.  However, 
these regional countries are listed under “main anti-government actors” that assist the Taliban 
because their support to the Taliban plays a larger role in the conflict than their official 
relationships with Kabul.  
                                                
41 “Gov’t Circles Facilitating Insurgent Attacks: MPs” (Kabul, Ariana News, 2018).  
42 “EU Voices Concern over Sell of Security Forces Weapons to Taliban” (Kabul, Ariana News, 2017).  
43 “Farakhabar: Alleged Presence of Fifth Pillar in Security Agencies Discussed” (Kabul, Tolo News, 2016).  
44 “Local Security Officials will be Trialed for Leaving Stations to Taliban: Kamawal,” ( Kabul, Ariana 
News, 2016).  
45 “Qadir: Daesh commanders in Kabul, commuting in security institutions,” (Kabul, Ariana News, 2015).  
Azizi	  17	  
	  
	   	  
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s alleged branch in the Afghan-Pakistan area is 
known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) or Daesh’s Khorasan province. ISKP first 
entered the battle-scene in Afghanistan in 2014, raising their flags in Nangarhar province. 
However, this paper doesn’t consider ISKP as a main anti-government actor in the current phase 
of the Afghan war.  
 Foremost, ISKP isn’t a significant force threatening the stability and territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan. According to a report published by the Middle East Institute, “The Islamic State has 
so far failed to recreate its success in Syria and Iraq and establish a stronghold in Afghanistan.” 46 
ISKP is a relatively weak actor than the Taliban. According to last year’s United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) report on civilian causalities, the Taliban remains 
the main actor that inflicts the majority of the causalities in the Afghan war.  The report indicated 
that the Taliban was responsible for 65% of the civilian causalities in the war whereas 15% of 
civilian causalities was inflicted by ISKP. Also, the report indicated that the causalities attributed 
to the Taliban is under-reported due to the lack of access to Taliban-controlled areas to gather 
accurate information.47 In reality, the Taliban is responsible for more than 65% of the civilian 
casualties.  
 Furthermore, although, ISKP operates under the banner of ISIS, there is no proven 
connection between ISKP and the group in Syria and Iraq. TRT, a Turkish-based news agency, 
reported that there “Is no ‘hard evidence’ to show operational links between the members in 
Afghanistan and Baghdadi’s group in the Middle East.”48 Rather, Afghan officials have concluded 
                                                
46Lauran McNally, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa, “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: 
Examining its Threat to Stability,” (Washington D.C., Middle East Institute, 2016). 
47“Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2017” (Kabul, United Nations 
Mission Assistance in Afghanistan and United Nations Human Rights Council Office of the High 
Commissioner, 2018).  
48 “Is Deash A Reality in Afghanistan?” ( Istanbul, TRT World, 2016).  
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that ISKP is the Taliban operating under a different flag. According to Faqir Mohammad Jowzjani, 
the police chief of Jowzjan province, “Taliban are now operating under the name of Daesh by 
raising their flags.” 49 Similarly, Tolo News, an Afghan news agency,  reported that the Afghan 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) concluded that the large-scale attacks are carried out by Haqqani 
network (a subgroup of the Quetta Shura led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the deputy of the Quetta 
Shura)  under the name of Daesh.50 Essentially, it is the Taliban raising ISIS’ flag in Afghanistan.  
 Analysts believe that the Taliban’s attempt to operate under the ISIS flag is due to the 
Taliban’s desire to rebrand itself as a relatively moderate group than ISKP to the local Afghan 
population. Moreover, Borhan Osman, an analyst at Afghanistan Analyst Network, noted that the 
members of the Taliban dissatisfied with the larger Taliban movement use the banner of ISKP to 
“To settle scores with their ex-comrades.”51 The Haqqani network administers the attacks of the 
Taliban and ISKP. However, the combat between the Taliban and ISKP is between the members 
of the main Taliban group and the Taliban that are disenchanted with elements of the main 
group.  Therefore, in this paper, ISKP isn’t considered a main-actor in the current phase of the 
Afghan war because the Afghan government concluded that ISKP in Afghanistan is just the 
Taliban operating under a different color of flag.  
  Moreover, the main actors that are combatting against the Taliban are the Afghan 
government and the international community. In the Afghan government, the main forces that are 
combatting the Taliban forces are the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), and Afghan political figures that are in favor of the regime in Kabul. Furthermore, from 
the international community, NATO and the United States are the main actors that are supporting 
                                                
49 “Taliban Militants Raise Daesh Flags in Jowzjan: Officials” ( Kabul, Tolo News, 2016).  
50 Syed Zabiullah Langari, “The Rise And Fall Of Daesh’s Caliphate” ( Kabul, Tolo News, 2018).  
51 “Is Deash A Reality in Afghanistan?” ( Istanbul, TRT World, 2016). 
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the Afghan government to combat the Taliban. Since 2001, NATO has been assisting the Afghan 
government to strengthen its security institutions and its counter-terrorism capabilities. Similarly, 
since 2001, the United States is aiding the Afghan government to strengthen its capabilities to 
counter the Taliban. Washington is the main donor providing the Afghan government the resources 
it requires to combat the Taliban.  
Although there are many actors involved in the current war in Afghanistan, this paper only 
examines the destabilizing role that the main regional states have in the conflict. Since the Taliban 
is the main-anti government force, this paper will identify and explain the destabilizing role that 
regional actors play in the war vis-à-vis the relations of the regional players with the Taliban.  
Defining the Taliban 
 
 In October 2001, the Taliban’s regime crumbled as the United States assisted the UIFSA 
to overthrow the Taliban’s government.  Within the span of two months, the Taliban’s political 
and military power reduced significantly. As the Taliban’s regime dwindled, hundreds of fighters 
escape to Pakistan. In Pakistan, the ISI assisted the Taliban to rebuild its militaristic capabilities. 
However, the Taliban lacked the political legitimacy it once enjoyed in 1994 when they marched 
into Afghanistan as the Mujahideen were consumed by their own internal rivalries. To fill this void 
of political legitimacy, the Taliban became more flexible in accommodating the interests of 
regional powers to induce greater regional support for its insurgency. 
 In the years after 2001, in the second phase of the Taliban’s insurgency, the Taliban lacks 
popular support. In a survey published by Langer Research Associates, only 4% of Afghans 
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support the Taliban, whereas 92% of Afghans support the democratic government in Kabul.52 
Unlike other insurgent groups that rely on popular support to maintain the insurgency, the Taliban 
relies on regional states to sustain its insurgency. 
 Considering the dynamics of the Taliban’s insurgency, this paper defines the Taliban as a 
conglomerate group of militia proxies that serve the interests of regional powers. With the 
assistance of regional sponsors and rogue elements within Kabul, the Taliban carries out its 
operations inside Afghanistan.  
 The Taliban’s fighters are local Afghans who join the Taliban to avenge the Afghan 
government due to grievances, foreign fighters from regional countries, and students from 
madrassas in Pakistan. However, the majority of the Taliban’s fighters still come from the 
madrassas in Pakistan. Specifically, these fighters mostly come from madrassas led by Jamiat-i-
Ulama-i-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Sami (JUI-S). The JUI-F is led by 
Maulana Fazlur Rahman, a Pakistani politician who endorses the Taliban’s war in Afghanistan. 
The JUI-S is led by Sami ul Haq, a Pakistani politician, known as the Father of the Taliban, who 
mainly leads the Darul Uloom Haqqania. Haq’s seminiary, Darul Uloom Haqqania, is commonly 
known as “University of Jihad” as nearly 80% of students from his madrassa sympathize with the 
Taliban or join the ranks of the Taliban.53  
 
The Structure of the Taliban 
 
                                                
52 “Afghan Futures: A National Public Opinion Survey” ( New York City, Langer Research 
Associates, 2015).  
53	  Tim Craig, “Pakistan’s ‘University of Jihad’ is Getting Millions of dollars from the 
government,” ( Washington D.C., Washington Post, 2016). 
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          Today, the Taliban is a loosely-collected proxy group comprised of four factions. The group 
has nearly 200,000 members. According to a report published by Landinfo, a Norweigan 
organization dedicated to collecting and analyzing data in various countries, “The [Taliban’s] 
mobile units are mostly based in Pakistan and Iran and deploy to Afghanistan during the fighting 
season, in part for logistical reasons and also because many fighters have family in those countries”  
        The main faction of the Taliban is the Quetta Shura headed by Mullah Haibatullah Akunzada. 
The three splinter groups are the Rasool Shura, Mashad Shura, and the Shura of the North. 54 
Theoretically, the Quetta Shura is mainly active in the southern and north-western provinces of 
Afghanistan, the Shura of North is active in the north-eastern provinces, the Mashad Shura 
operates in the western provinces, and the Rasool Shura is mainly active in the western and 
southern provinces of Afghanistan.55 However, in reality,  the Taliban is active in nearly all parts 
of Afghanistan.  
 Furthermore, despite the presence of multiple factions within the Taliban, this paper will 
refer to the Taliban as an umbrella-term that encompasses all of the four factions. This paper takes 
this approach due to the nature of the group. Often, the attacks carried out by the Taliban in 




History of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations 
 
                                                
54 Shahab ud Din Ahmad, “Afghanistan on the brink: Can the Taliban negotiate with Kabul?,” (Karachi, 
The Herald, 2018). 
55 Antonio Giustozzi, “Taliban and Islamic State: Enemies or Brothers in Jihad?” (Washington D.C., Center 
for Reasearch & Policy Analysis, 2017).  
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 On August 14, 1947, the modern state of Pakistan was established. However, Afghanistan 
never recognized Pakistan due to Kabul’s rejection of Pakistan’s internationally-recognized 
borders. From the start, Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan soured as Afghanistan was the 
only country that opposed Pakistan’s membership to the United Nations in 1947.  
 Since the birth of Pakistan, the Durand line has been a source of tension between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.56 The Durand Line is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan that 
was created during the British’s reign over the Indian subcontinent. Due to the border dispute, in 
the subsequent years following the birth of the modern Pakistani state, the monarchy in Kabul 
supported Pakistani-Pashtun nationalists and encouraged them to carry out malign activities in 
Pakistan’s border, further souring Kabul’s ties with Islamabad.57  
 On September 6, 1961, relations between Kabul and Islamabad reached its lowest. 
Afghanistan severed its diplomatic ties with Pakistan following Islamabad’s request to Kabul to 
close its trade agencies and consulates in Pakistan's western provinces. Pakistan stated that the 
Afghan government’s subversive activities in Pakistan was the reason for the closure of the 
consulates and trade agencies. Kabul responded by closing its border with Pakistan. However, the 
lack of trade between both states caused significant economic losses on both sides. As a result of 
these losses, in 1963, both countries restored their bilateral relations and pledged to respect each 
other’s respective sovereignty.58  
 A year after the restoration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad, from 1964-1973, 
Afghanistan went through a period of significant political transformation. Afghanistan witnessed 
                                                
56 Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,”  
(Washington D.C., Middle East Institute, 2017).  
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a period of rapid modernization.59 Key characteristics of the modern Afghan government were the 
establishment of political parties, an Afghan parliament, free media, and legalized protests. The 
Afghan monarchy became a symbolic power as the Afghan constitution was established. Pakistan 
took advantage of Kabul’s new liberal government by establishing assets in Kabul. Pakistan 
cultivated ties with the Afghan population to lure proxies and spies to work in favor of Islamabad 
in Afghanistan. Of these recruits, Pakistan’s most prominent agent in Afghanistan was and 
continues to be Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.60 
 Shortly after the end of the modernization era in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s proxy war in 
Afghanistan began during Mohammad Daud’s presidency.  In 1973, Afghanistan’s liberal era 
came to an end as the monarchy was overthrown by Daud. Daud established the Republic of 
Afghanistan and declared himself as the republic’s president.  During Daud’s reign, he frequently 
brought up the issue of the Durand Line, thereby angering Pakistan. At the same time, Daud faced 
opposition by a minority of Afghans who opposed the communists’ influence in his government.  
These dissidents fled to Pakistan and were supported by Pakistan’s ISI to carry out attacks against 
Daud’s government. Pakistan utilized these dissidents as a tool to coerce Daud to change his policy 
of confronting Pakistan.  
  In 1978, Daud’s regime was overthrown by the PDPA and Taraki succeeded as the 
president of Afghanistan. Taraki’s regime caused the first significant wave of Afghan dissidents 
to flee to Pakistan. Furthermore, in the subsequent years, from 1978-1992, Afghan dissidents who 
opposed the succeeding Soviet-backed regimes in Afghanistan fled to Pakistan. In Pakistan, these 
dissidents were trained and supported by ISI to subvert the regimes in Kabul. These dissidents 
were known as the Mujahideen. Aid from Riyadh and Washington poured into Pakistan to support 
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the Mujahideen against the Soviet-backed regimes in Kabul. As Pakistan was hosting the Afghan 
Mujahideen, from 1978-1992, the relationship between the official governments in Kabul and 
Islamabad soured. 
From 1978-1989, as the Soviet backed communist regimes remained in Kabul, Pakistan 
channeled most of the aid from Riyadh and Washington to Hekmatyar. Hektmatyar was Pakistan’s 
proxy in Afghanistan. Pakistan was determined to establish a cordial relationship with a Post-
Soviet Afghanistan by installing its agent, Hekmatyar, in power. According to Tomsen,  “Pakistani 
dictator Zia ul-Haq’s vision for Afghanistan’s future was sweeping, audacious- and unreliable…it 
sought to install a radical Islamist Afghan regime in Kabul led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar after the 
Soviet withdrawal.”61 
In April 1992, as Najibullah’s regime collapsed, Kabul’s ailing governmental institutions 
crumbled. Pakistan exploited the power vacuum inside Afghanistan. From 1992-2001, Pakistan 
played a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s domestic politics. In those nine years, Pakistan 
aided anti-government figures. As a result of Pakistan’s overwhelming interference in 
Afghanistan’s politics, the regime in Kabul never recovered to function as a prosperous 
government. Pakistan’s support for rebels led to a de facto absence of a government in Kabul from 
1992-2001.  
 On April 30, 1992, a weak interim government was established in Kabul led by 
Sibghatullah Mujadeddi.62 Despite the establishment of the government in Kabul, the ISI supplied 
Hekmatyar with weapons, giving him an incentive to revolt against the interim government. As 
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Hekmatyar revolted against Kabul, a bloody civil war ensued between the Mujahideen factions 
until 1996.  
While the ISI was fueling the civil war in Kabul, Islamabad was simultaneously nurturing 
the Taliban. Pakistan had envisioned the Taliban to succeed Hekmatyar in governing the Afghan 
government. As Hekmatyar’s attempts at seizing absolute power failed, Pakistan sought to 
transform Afghanistan into its client state by establishing the Taliban’s regime in Kabul.  
With the help of Pakistan, as Steve Coll notes, “It's impossible to understand the Taliban's 
military triumph in Afghanistan, culminating in their takeover of Kabul in 1996, without 
understanding that they were a proxy force, a client of the Pakistan army, and benefited from all 
of the materiel support that the Pakistan army could provide them, given its own constrained 
resources.”63 In fact,  William Maley notes in his book, the “Taliban did not emerge from 
nowhere,” it was a strategically calculated movement by Pakistan.64 The Taliban’s movement was 
consolidated during Benazir Bhuttos’ second term (1993-1996). Nasrullah Babar, Pakistan’s 
interior minister, created the Afghan Trade Development Cell in his ministry. According to Rashid, 
the Afghan Trade Development Cell’s “Principle task was to provide logistical backing for the 
Taliban.” 65 Pakistan provided the Taliban with the funds and resources it required to take 
Afghanistan from the Mujahideen.  
Islamabad provided the Taliban access to telecommunication, weapons, food, and other 
supplied needed to maintain its insurgency.  Bhutto’s government allocated parts of its budget to 
pay for the expenses of the Taliban’s administration and the Taliban’s war efforts. Pakistan’s 
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Azizi	  26	  
	  
	   	  
“Foreign ministry needed to hide this money in its own budget and that of other ministries, so that 
it would no appear on the 1998/9 budget record and be kept away from the prying eyes of 
international donors.”66 Pakistan also facilitated the Taliban’s purchase of arms and ammunition 
from Ukraine and eastern Europe. From 1997-1998, Pakistan provided the Taliban with 
approximately 30 million dollars in aid.  
In 1994, with Pakistan’s support, the Taliban entered Afghanistan via Kandahar and swiftly 
gained control over it. According to Rashid, “The fall of Kandahar was celebrated by Pakistan’s 
government… Babar [ Pakistan’s Interior Minister] took credit for the Taliban’s success, telling 
journalists privately that the Taliban were ‘our boys.” 67 With Pakistan’s assistance, the Taliban 
were able to launch successful military campaigns, taking control of key strategic provinces.68 By 
2001, the Taliban controlled nearly 90% of Afghanistan’s territory.  
However, the attacks on September 11th 2001, led to the demise of the Taliban’s regime.  
The September 11th attacks led Washington to initiate a military campaign against Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. As the international community rallied behind the United States to 
over-throw the Taliban’s regime, Pakistan initially opposed the overthrowing of the Taliban’s 
regime. 69 It was only when Washington emphasized to Islamabad the importance of supporting 
the United States’ Operating Enduring Freedom that Pakistan portrayed its support on the 
international level. According to The Guardian, “The Bush administration threatened to bomb 
Pakistan ‘back to the stone age’ after the September 11 attacks if the country did not cooperate 
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with America's war on Afghanistan.”70 Hence, Pakistan reluctantly accepted the toppling of the 
Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan.  
In the eve of the September 11 attacks, as Washington carried out its airstrikes against the 
Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan, hundreds of Taliban fighters fled to Pakistan. Pakistan 
superficially showed its solidarity with the United States by temporarily arresting the Taliban’s 
religious mentors in Pakistan.71 However, covertly, according to the Brookings Institute, “The ISI 
was providing refuge to the entire Taliban leadership after it fled from Afghanistan. Mullah Omar 
was kept in an ISI safe house in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, while his militia was 
lodged in Pashtunabad, a sprawling Quetta suburb.”72 Not only did Pakistan shelter the Taliban 
but the ISI also assisted the Taliban to rebuild its insurgency.  Due to the ISI’s assistance, by 2003, 
the Taliban’s militaristic fronts near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were established, enabling it 
launch attacks inside Afghanistan. Till date, Pakistan continues to nurture the Taliban because, 
according to Tomsen, “The military collective ruling Pakistan considered the Taliban’s survival 
vital to their proxy war strategy in Afghanistan.”73  
 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban 
 
After the demise of the Taliban’s regime, Pakistan has maintained official ties with the 
subsequent governments in Kabul. Despite Islamabad’s official ties with Kabul, the ISI still 
sponsors the Taliban. Pakistan has significant interests in supporting the Taliban. The Taliban is 
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an asset to Islamabad because its dedicated to serving Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and the 
region. ”74   
Christine Fair, an expert on South Asia, labeled the Taliban as a state proxy. At the Raisina 
Dialogue, Fair noted that these proxies operate with the Pakistani government’s support and “Are 
tools of statecraft.”75 In fact, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is a core pillar of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy and grand strategy.  
According to a Rand Corporation report titled, “India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in 
Afghanistan,” Pakistan has several objectives in Afghanistan.76 In the National Interest, I noted 
that “Pakistan desires to block Indian influence in Afghanistan, undermine Kabul’s claims on the 
disputed territories near the current Afghanistan-Pakistan border, maintain a strategic depth in 
Afghanistan, establish safe havens in Afghanistan for Pakistani-trained extremists, and to prevent 
Afghanistan’s regional integration. All of Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan can only be 
achieved through Pakistan’s patronage of the Taliban.”77 
Pakistan is an insecure state. Following the partition of British India and the creation of the 
modern Pakistani state, Islamabad has had territorial disputes with two of its neighbors, India and 
Afghanistan. Till date, Pakistan has a thorny relationship with both of these neighbors. As a result 
of these thorny relations, Pakistan views these two neighbors as a threat. However, traditionally, 
New Delhi and Kabul has maintained cordial relations due to their shared animosity with 
Islamabad. Therefore, Islamabad seeks to establish a friendly client state in Afghanistan via the 
Taliban.  
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While Islamabad doesn’t have the capacity to significantly influence domestic politics in 
India, it does have that capacity in Afghanistan. The prolonged, ongoing 45-years conflict in 
Afghanistan has damaged Afghanistan’s state institutions and has enabled Islamabad to 
significantly influence Afghanistan’s political landscape. In Kabul, Pakistan seeks to obstruct the 
establishment of a traditionally pro-Delhi, anti- Islamabad, and sovereign government in Kabul by 
strengthening the Taliban to exert greater influence in Afghanistan’s domestic politics, thereby 
weakening the credibility of the official regime in Kabul. An increase in the Taliban’s influence 
in Afghanistan’s domestic politics would inevitably decrease India’s influence in Afghanistan as 
the Indian-supported regimes in Kabul becomes weaker. 
Furthermore, Pakistan supports the Taliban to prevent Afghanistan’s reintegration into the 
region. Islamabad seeks to abet the Taliban to fuel instability in Afghanistan to further weaken 
Kabul’s state institutions.  Islamabad desires a weak Kabul to prevent the Afghan government 
from ever obtaining the political and militaristic capabilities it had in 1950s and 1960s to carry out 
subversive activities in Pakistan.78 Similarly, a weak Kabul plagued by insurgency would inhibit 
Kabul from challenging Pakistan’s internationally-recognized border across the Durand Line.  
Moreover, Pakistan is keen on using Afghanistan’s territory against India. Pakistan seeks 
to utilize the territory inside Afghanistan that is under the Taliban’s influence as a strategic depth.79 
The ISI assists the Taliban to control large swaths of Afghanistan’s territory to enable the Pakistani 
army’s leadership to have access to a strategic depth in the scenario that war breaks out between 
Pakistan and India. Additionally, like in the 1990s, Islamabad seeks to utilize Afghanistan’s 
territory as a safe haven to harbor extremists to counter India’s influence in the region.80  
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In the long-term, Pakistan’s goal is to attain regional hegemony to counter India’s 
influence. Fair notes in her book, Fighting to the End: the Pakistan Army’s Way of War, that  
“Pakistan’s defense literature clearly maintains that Pakistan’s army aims to resists India’s position 
of regional dominance and its slow but steady global ascent.”81 The Taliban is a key actor in 
advancing Pakistan’s grand strategy.  Islamabad is utilizing the Taliban as a means to attain 
regional hegemony.  
To achieve regional hegemony, Tomsen, notes that Pakistan seeks to “Forge a broader 
Islamist bloc of Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and eventually Central Asia to balance India, 
Pakistan’s traditional rival.”82 Pakistan is attempting to install a puppet regime in Afghanistan via 
its proxies. To that end, Pakistan is currently fueling the Taliban’s war of attrition in Afghanistan. 
Through its war of attrition, Pakistan seeks to wear down Washington’s counter-terrorism efforts 
and induce it to withdraw from Afghanistan by raising the costs of war. Pakistan’s success in 
Afghanistan via the installment of the Taliban’s regime would be a starting point for it to create an 
Islamist bloc that would counter India.  
 
Pakistan’s role in the current Afghan conflict (2001-Present) 
 
Pakistan will continue to support the Taliban as Islamabad deems it as a means to attain its 
national interests. Since 2001 and as long as the current phase of Afghanistan’s intrastate conflict 
endures, Pakistan will continue to fuel the Taliban’s momentum.  Tomsen accurately observes that 
“The most acute threat to a stable, peaceful, and neutral Afghanistan will continue to come from 
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Pakistan, even though nearly all of Afghanistan’s other neighbors also support their own Afghan 
proxies… Islamabad has been funneling more troops and military resources to save its own asset, 
the Taliban.”83 As long as Pakistan sponsors the Taliban, the current war in Afghanistan will never 
come to an end. This is so because Pakistan is a veto player in the current phase of the intrastate 
conflict in Afghanistan.  
A veto player is an actor who’s “Consent is required for a negotiated end to a civil war.”84 
Academic research has proven that veto players must agree to end a war otherwise, the war will 
not come to an end. 85 A veto player can change the direction of a conflict because it has significant 
influence on the outcome of a conflict. Cunningham’s research proves that veto players are those 
that have significant influence upon the main actors in the conflict. Moreover, Cunningham proves 
that the stronger the veto player is, the more intense the conflict will be. 
Pakistan’s intimate relationship with the Taliban makes Islamabad a veto player. The 
inception of the Taliban movement was engineered by Pakistan. In 1994, with the help of Pakistan, 
the Taliban first marched into Afghanistan via Kandahar. Not only did Pakistan provide the 
Taliban with the logistics it required to maintain its insurgency but during the Taliban’s reign, 
according to Tomsen, the ISI “Played the major role in military matters, from organizing offenses 
to equipping the forces that were fighting, and even putting out public statements. … There was a 
colonel in Herat and there was a major in Kandahar -- they were coaching Mullah Omar and other 
Taliban, who were for the most part semiliterate, on how to administer their areas and how to 
proceed militarily.”86 Militarily, Coll notes that the Taliban had “Direct on-the-ground support 
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from undercover Pakistani officers in civilian clothes who would participate in particular military 
battles” against the UIFSA. Moreover, following the 9/11 attacks, despite Pakistan’s pledge to 
cooperate with Washington, Pakistan continued to shelter and support the Taliban. Till date, 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban fuels the Taliban’s insurgency.  
Furthermore, as a veto player, Pakistan has significant influence to steer the direction of 
the conflict in Afghanistan. Tomsen noted in an interview with PBS that, Pakistan “Could close it 
[the Taliban’s training centers] down overnight.”87 Given Pakistan’s overwhelming influence on 
the Taliban, Islamabad could bring the war to an end. However, given Pakistan’s perceived 
interests in supporting the Taliban, Islamabad chooses to prolong the war. 
Like any veto player, Pakistan has the ability to unilaterally continue the Taliban’s 
insurgency. Cunningham notes in his study that, “To be a veto player a group must have the ability 
to continue the war unilaterally.” 88 Pakistan has the ability to unilaterally run the Afghan war. In 
2013-2015, Pakistan’s ISI was conducting the Taliban’s insurgency. In 2013, Mullah Omar, the 
leader of the Taliban movement, died at a prominent hospital in Karachi, Pakistan. However, 
Pakistan’s ISI managed to keep his death hidden for two years.89 In those two years, from 2013-
2015, the Taliban’s insurgency was flourishing without its leader due to Pakistan’s support. 
Also, veto player players have the ability to exacerbate a conflict. Cunningham’s research 
proves that the stronger the veto player is, the more intense a conflict will be. In Afghanistan, the 
Taliban’s insurgency intensifies every year. In July 2018, the United Nations observed that the 
reported civilian casualties in the war in Afghanistan has hit its record highest.90 Currently, the 
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Taliban threaten nearly 70% of Afghanistan’s territory, more than it ever has since 2001.91 With 
Pakistan’s support, the Taliban will continue to expand its influence and intensify its insurgency 
in Afghanistan. 
According to Cunningham’s study, a veto player must approve the outcome of a war and 
the negotiation process leading to end of a war. In Afghanistan, the termination of the current 
intrastate conflict will only occur when Pakistan deems it in its interest to end the war. Pakistan 
will only end the war in the scenario that the Taliban comes to power. Otherwise, Pakistan won’t 
approve to end to the current conflict because Pakistan deems its interests as irreconcilable to 
Kabul’s interests. Pakistan perceives that an Afghanistan marred and crippled in warfare is to its 
interest. Therefore, as a significant veto player, Pakistan will continue to sponsor the Taliban and 




History of Afghanistan-Iran Relations 
 
In the mid 19th century, as Afghanistan established its internationally recognized borders, 
disputes over Afghanistan’s water has been a major source of tension between Tehran and Kabul. 
Both countries suffer from a shortage of water.92 Iran’s provinces that neighbor Afghanistan rely 
heavily on Afghanistan’s Helmand River and Hari River as a source of water. During the 20th 
century, Washington was the main mediator between Tehran and Kabul, encouraging both 
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governments to share its water resources. In 1939, Iran and Afghanistan signed a water-sharing 
treaty. However, according to the Atlantic Council, Afghanistan failed to ratify the treaty.93 Then, 
with Washington’s leadership, a U.S.-led commission, the Helmand Delta River Commission, 
concluded that 22 cubic meters of water per second should go to Iran via Afghanistan. However, 
Afghanistan rejected the recommendation given by the commission. Also, Iran sought to receive 
a greater share of Afghanistan’s water than the amount recommended by the commission. 
Subsequent to the recommendation prescribed by the Helmand Delta River Commission, 
four years of intense negotiation ensued between Kabul and Tehran, leading to a water-sharing 
agreement in 1973. The agreement stated that 22 cubic meters of water per second would go to 
Iran and that it would have the option to purchase an additional four cubic meters per second.94 
However, in that same year, the political upheaval in Kabul and Iran’s political upheaval in 1979 
prevented the full implementation of the water-sharing agreement. As a result of these upheavals, 
the political landscapes of Tehran and Kabul clashed. Subsequently, political issues emerged at 
the forefront of Tehran-Kabul relations while the water dispute was placed on the back-burner.  
From 1979-2001, clashing political ideologies defined the relationship between Tehran and 
Kabul. Following the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran denounced the 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Iran utilized the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity to establish a strong-proxy network in Afghanistan. The 
Iranian government mainly backed Hezb-e-Wahdat, an Afghan-Shia political party, led by Abdul 
Ali Mazari against the Soviet-backed regimes in Kabul.  
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Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1980, as Saddam Hussein initiated the 
Iraq-Iran war by attacking Iran, Tehran’s involvement in Afghanistan decreased. Due to the Iran-
Iraq war, Iran diverted most of its resources and attention to its war with Iraq to preserve the gains 
of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution. Although, Iran’s aid to Hezb-e-Wahdat was relatively less than 
the aid that the other Sunni-dominated Mujahideen factions received in Pakistan, due to Iran’s aid, 
Hezb-e-Wahdat remained a strong political and militaristic force in Afghanistan.  
The end of the Iran-Iraq war coincided with the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan. In 1989, 
as the Soviets withdrew and as Iran neutralized the Iraqi threat, Tehran expended a significant sum 
of its resources to Hezb-e Wahdat. As the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul crumbled, Iran backed 
its proxy, Hezb-e Wahdat, in the gruesome Mujahideen civil war that ensued until 1996.  
In 1996, following the Taliban’s reign over Kabul, Tehran backed the UIFSA. From 1996-
2001, Tehran supported the UIFSA’s campaign of resisting the Taliban’s control over large swaths 
of Afghanistan’s territory. Iran sent weapons to the UIFSA via the Central Asian Republics.  
 Iran was committed to countering the Taliban because the Taliban denounced the Iranian 
regime. According to a report published by Rand Corporation, the Taliban “Viewed Shia-
dominated Iran as a heresy.”95 The Taliban maintained a tough stance against Iran due to the 
backing it received from Iran’s arch-rival, Saudi Arabia.  
Furthermore, Iran was dedicated to resisting the Taliban’s movement into Afghanistan due 
to the Taliban’s support for subversive groups that were against the Iranian regime. A matter of 
great concern to Tehran was that “The Taliban were also secretly backing Iranian groups who were 
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anti-regime. In Kandahar, the Taliban had given sanctuary to Ahl-e-Sunnah Wal Jamaat, which 
recruited Iranian Sunni militants from Khorasan and Sistan provinces.”96 
Nearly a year after Tehran’s assistance to the UIFSA, on June 2nd 1997, the Taliban closed 
Iran’s embassy in Kabul. According to Rashid, “The Taliban were incensed with Iran’s support 
for the alliance…the Taliban closed down the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, accusing Iran of 
destroying peace and stability in Afghanistan.”97 
In March 1998, Tehran’s relationship with the Taliban had deteriorated unprecedentedly. 
The relationship between the Taliban and Tehran soured when the Taliban killed nine Iranian 
diplomats in the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Following the Taliban’s killings, Iran considered 
invading Afghanistan on the basis of “Defend[ing] the security of its citizens.”98 Along with 
Iranian popular support, hardliners in Tehran “Were calling for the invasion of the western 
provinces of Afghanistan.”99 However, Iran didn’t invade Afghanistan as the Taliban threatened 
to retaliate in the scenario of an Iranian invasion, stating that, “Iran must know that if the soil of 
Afghanistan is attacked, we will target Iranian cities and the entire responsibility will rest with 
Iranian authorities.” In that same year, from 1998, until the demise of the Taliban’s regime, the 
Taliban halted the flow of water from Helmand’s Kajaki dam to Iran. From 1998-2001, tension 
persisted between Tehran and the Taliban. Iran continued to support the UIFSA’s resistance, while 
the Taliban was assisted by Islamabad and Riyadh to counter the UIFSA.  
 Due to the Taliban’s hostility with Iran, in 2001, Iran welcomed the United States 
overthrow of the Taliban’s regime. 100 Although Tehran is an opponent of Washington, Iran’s 
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embracement of the United States’ overthrow of the Taliban’s regime was out of its own interest. 
Tehran vehemently opposed the presence of a Saudi-backed group in neighboring Afghanistan. 
Following the demise of the Taliban’s regime, Iran persuaded key members of the UIFSA to 
cooperate with the international communities’ efforts to form an interim government in Kabul.101 
In the years subsequent to 2001, the political confrontation between Kabul and Tehran decreased 
significantly. However, the relationship between Tehran and Kabul was defined by a new set of 
challenges: narcotics, the Afghan refugee population in Iran, and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. 
102 In recent years, despite these new set of challenges, Tehran’s and Kabul’s century-old water 
dispute on has been the main source of tension between both states.  
 In the years following 2001, the regimes in Kabul has made reconstruction and 
development a priority of the war-torn country. Kabul’s reconstruction plan includes the 
development of dams to effectively manage Afghanistan’s water, to improve Afghanistan’s 
agricultural capabilities, and to ultimately boost economic growth. At the same time, the water 
dispute between Iran and Afghanistan was placed on Tehran’s political agenda to negotiate with 
Kabul.103 Following the interim regime in Kabul, till date, Tehran has pushed to maximize its flow 
of water although, according to Article 5 of the 1973 treaty, Tehran pledged to not claim more than 
the agreed 22 cubic meters per second with an additional purchase of 4 cubic meters per second.104 
Nevertheless, despite Tehran’s demands, the subsequent regimes in Kabul since the fall of the 
Taliban, have been working with its international partners to build dams, thereby angering Tehran. 
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Furthermore, in recent years, the tension on Afghanistan’s water has increased due to a 
drought that has stricken the western provinces of Afghanistan and the eastern provinces of Iran.  
The tension regarding the water dispute is also exacerbated by the blame-game. Officials from 
Tehran and Kabul have been accusing its counterpart of not abiding by the 1973 treaty.  
The tensions regarding the water dispute was highlighted last year as the heads of state in 
Kabul and Tehran made public statements on Afghanistan’s water resources. In 2017, Iran’s 
President, Hassan Rouhani, denounced the Afghan government’s developmental plan to construct 
dams in various provinces. Rouhani stated that, “We cannot remain indifferent to the issue [water 
dams] which is apparently damaging our environment…Construction of several dams in 
Afghanistan, such as Kajaki, Kamal Khan, Salma and others in the north and south of Afghanistan, 
affect our Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan provinces.” Not surprisingly, his remarks were met 
with backlash in Afghanistan. Not only did Afghans protest against Rouhani’s statements, in 
response to his remarks, Ashraf Ghani, the president of Afghanistan, stated that, “Water is another 
major resource for Afghanistan…We are already investing in dams and irrigation infrastructure to 
raise agricultural productivity, and as technical designs are completed we will be accelerating 
investment in this sector that is key for both growth and poverty reduction.”105As Afghanistan 
continues its reconstruction plans by building dams, tensions with Iran over the flow of water will 
not only persist but will be inevitable.    
 
Iran’s role in the current Afghan conflict (2001-Present) 
 
Although Iran maintains official ties with the government in Kabul, Iran also maintains  
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covert ties with the Taliban. Iran pursues this dual-track policy as a means to further advance its 
national interests. Tehran’s official ties with Kabul heavily revolves around its economic interests. 
Tehran’s covert ties with the Taliban are heavily influenced by Iran’s national security interests. 
Tehran’s covert ties with the Taliban have played a larger role in the current phase of the 
conflict in Afghanistan rather than its official ties with the Afghan government. In the current 
conflict in Afghanistan, Iran is a third-party actor. Iran’s intervention in Afghanistan as a third-
party actor that supports the Taliban has contributed to prolonging the war.  
Lindsay’s and Enterline’s study proves that the type of intervention by a third-party actor 
is carried out on the basis of calculations based on the benefits and national interests of the third-
party actor.106 In Afghanistan, Tehran deems it in its interest to support the Taliban. Although 
Iran’s support for the Taliban is irrelevant to the goals of the Taliban, Iran still supports the Taliban. 
The Taliban seeks the withdrawal of international forces whereas, Tehran prefers the presence of 
international forces in Kabul rather than the imminent take over of Afghanistan by the Taliban, 
supported by Riyadh. Yet, as a third-party actor Tehran supports the Taliban’s insurgency.  
In May 2018, the United States’ Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, stated that Iran supports 
the Taliban. 107 However, Iran’s support for the Taliban can be traced back to the early years of 
the Taliban’s second phase of incursion into Afghanistan. As early as 2005, Iran supported the 
Taliban’s war efforts. 108 Not only has Iran provided the Taliban with the resource they require to 
continue its insurgency, Iran has also provided the Taliban with the training it needs to further 
strengthen its insurgency. 109 
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Although in the 1990s, the Taliban opposed Iran, in the second phase of the Taliban’s 
insurgency, the Taliban has become more accommodating to the interests of regional powers, 
including Iran. After 2001, the Taliban is no longer an anti-Shia group that seeks confrontation 
with Iran. Hence, Iran supports the Taliban to strengthen its insurgency while the Taliban assists 
Iran to secure its interest in Afghanistan.  
Iran’s support for the Taliban is tied to its water security.110 As Afghanistan desires to 
manage the flow of its water by building dams, Iran seeks to halt the construction of  these 
dams. Iran views the establishment of dams in Afghanistan as a threat to its national interests. 
Iran views the dams as a threat to its interest because not only are Iran’s eastern provinces 
heavily dependent on Afghanistan’s water but, Iran’s eastern provinces have been inflicted with 
severe drought in the recent years. Therefore, Iran is keen on maximizing the flow of water 
from Afghanistan to its eastern provinces. 
To hinder the progress of the construction of dams in Afghanistan, Iran supports the 
Taliban. Ali Ahmad, an Afghan police officer guarding the construction of a dam in the Nimruz 
province of Afghanistan, told The Guardian that, “When work on the dam begins, of course 
security will worsen.”111 The security near the development sites of these dams deteriorate 
because Iran assists the Taliban to carry out attacks near these site. In 2011, according to The 
Guardian, “ a captured Taliban commander claimed to have received $ 50,000 and military 
training in Iran to sabotage the Kamal Khan dam.”112 Tehran abets the Taliban to bring 
insecurity to these sites because Tehran seeks to delay the development of these dams to 
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maximize the flow of water to Iran. In an effort to halt the construction of these dams, Iran 
supports the Taliban’s insurgency by providing it with training, funds, and resources. In return, 
the Taliban attacks the construction sites of the dams in the provinces that neighbor Iran.  
Furthermore, as I’ve noted in an article for the National Interest, Iran fuels instability in 
Afghanistan by supporting the Taliban “When its relationship with Washington deteriorates. 
Tehran uses Afghanistan as a leverage to exert pressure on the United States. Specifically, Iran 
does this by arming and training the Taliban to carry out attacks, raising the costs of war for 
Washington. Nearly a week after President Trump announced his decision to withdraw from 
the Iran nuclear deal, Iran helped the Taliban lead a major offensive in Farah.113As Tehran 
calculated, the Taliban was pushed back from Farah only when American special forces entered 
the combat zone.” 114 
In the current phase of the conflict in Afghanistan, Iran is exploiting the devasting security 
situation in Afghanistan to its advantage by supporting the Taliban.  As a third-party actor, Tehran 
lacks the intimate relationship that Islamabad enjoys with the Taliban. However, Iran’s support for 
the Taliban is only possible due to Islamabad’s overarching support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
In this phase of the conflict, Tehran is fanning the flames of insecurity that was ignited by Pakistan 
to further advance its own interests. Given Tehran’s interests in Afghanistan, Iran will continue to 
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Saudi Arabia 
                               History of Afghanistan- Saudi Arabia Relations 
 
In the modern history of the ties between Riyadh and Kabul, up until the 1970s, 
Afghanistan’s relations with Riyadh was warm but diplomatic interaction was limited. On the basis 
of religion, Afghanistan, an Islamic country, had friendly ties with Saudi Arabia, the custodian of 
Islam’s two holy mosques. However, Afghanistan’s foreign policy of non-alignment during the 
Cold War hindered it from establishing strong ties with the western bloc and its allies, including 
Riyadh.  It was only in 1977 that Afghanistan’s President, Mohammad Daud, revamped his foreign 
policy and sought to strengthen its ties with the western bloc. As a result of this foreign policy 
shift, Daud increased his visits to Saudi Arabia. However, the warm ties between Riyadh and Kabul 
was short-lived as Daud’s regime came to an end on April 28 1978. 
Riyadh’s relationship with Kabul took a sharp turn on April 30, 1978 as Nur Mohammad 
Taraki, the Soviet-backed leader, came to power. Riyadh opposed the regime in Kabul and shared 
Pakistan’s and Washington’s interests of providing funds and arms to the Mujahideen. From 1978-
1989, Riyadh provided significant aid to the Mujahideen to undermine the regimes in Kabul and 
to weaken the Soviet’s military campaign in Afghanistan. Riyadh also provided funds to madrassas 
that were dedicated to educating Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Overall, Saudi Arabia’s aid to the 
Mujahideen came from two channels. According to Tomsen, “Saudi funding for the anti-Soviet 
Afghan jihad moved through two pipelines. One was managed by Prince Turki al-Faisal, the 
nephew of the king and head of the king’s external intelligence agency, General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID). Most of the aid Turki managed was integrated into the CIA’s covert weapons 
program. The Saudi government matched the American contribution dollar for dollar. The CIA 
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purchased the weapons and handled the transportation logistics until the cargo was transferred to 
the ISI in Pakistan. Turki and Yusef Motabbankani, the Saudi Ambassador in Islamabad, 
distributed millions more in cash to radical Sunni Mujahidin politicians, ulema, and commanders 
in Pakistan who advocated a future Afghanistan ruled by sharia. The second “private” Saudi 
pipeline splintered into innumerable public and private charities and individual donors. It was 
much larger, though no one ever knew how large, given the complete lack of oversight by any 
government entity.” 115 However, as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Riyadh shifted most 
of its aid to Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, two figures from the Afghan 
Mujahideen that were closely aligned with Riyadh.  
 In 1992, as the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan collapsed, an interim government led 
by Sibgatullah Mujaddidi and subsequently led by Burhanuddin Rabbani were undermined by 
elements of the Mujahideen who were backed by regional powers. Riyadh maintained its close ties 
with Sayyaf and Hekmatyar and armed them in the brutal civil war that proceeded until the 
Taliban’s takeover. In the early 1990s, Riyadh was keen on using its proxies in Afghanistan to 
counter Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and the influence of Afghan political elites that adhered to 
Shi'ism.116  
Riyadh’s anti-government activities against the internationally recognized Afghan 
government continued throughout the first phase of the Taliban’s insurgency. Not only was Saudi 
Arabia one of the three countries that officially recognized the Taliban’s government but Riyadh 
also viewed the Taliban  “As an important asset to their dwindling influence in Afghanistan.”117 
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Saudi Arabia opposed the U.N. recognized Afghan government for two reasons. Foremost, 
Riyadh was skeptical of Rabbani’s government due to its friendly ties with Iran. Secondly, 
Pakistan, a key ally of Riyadh, vehemently opposed members of the UIFSA within Rabbani’s 
government. Not only did Riyadh’s and Islamabad’s support for the Taliban affect Afghanistan 
but it affected the entire region. According to Rashid, the Taliban’s advances inside Afghanistan 
“Infuriated Russia, Turkey, and the Central Asian states who blamed Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
for backing the Taliban.”118  
Riyadh undermined the official Afghan government by funding the Taliban.119 In fact, 
Riyadh played an active role in strengthening the Taliban’s insurgency. Since the Taliban’s 
inception, Riyadh had a significant role in the Taliban’s movement. Foremost, Saudi Arabia 
funded the madrassas in Pakistan that cultivated the Taliban’s mindset. As the Taliban’s movement 
shifted to Afghanistan from Pakistan, Riyadh supplied the Taliban with fuel, money, weapons, and 
pick-up trucks.120 Prior to the Taliban seizing Kabul, according to Rashid, “The Saudi intelligence 
chief Prince Turki al Faisal visited Islamabad and Kandahar in July 1996 to discuss with the ISI a 
new plan to take Kabul, and both countries stepped up supplies to the Taliban.”121 Moreover, 
Riyadh bribed key Afghan commanders to surrender Afghanistan’s territory to the Taliban. 
According to Rashid, “ Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped engineer the surrender and eventual 
flight of the head of the Jalalabad Shura, Haji Abdul Qadeer.”122 With the help of Riyadh and 
Islamabad, the Taliban successfully captured not only the eastern provinces of Afghanistan but 
eventually most of Afghanistan’s terroritory from Rabbani’s government.   
                                                







	   	  
In 1998, as the Taliban continued to expand northwards, every major offensive remained 
strategically planned by Pakistan’s ISI and funded by Riyadh.  Given Riyadh’s intimate ties with 
the Taliban and Riyadh’s anti-Iran policy, as the Taliban marched into Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban 
massacred Hazaras, Afghans who mainly share Iran’s religious faith. 123 According to Rashid, with 
Riyadh’s blessing,“ the Taliban aimed to cleanse the north of Shia.”124 
Towards the end of the first phase of the Taliban’s insurgency, Riyadh’s relations with the 
Taliban declined. According to Rashid, “only when Prince Turki was personally insulted by 
Mullah Omar in Kandahar did the Saudis curtail diplomatic links to the Taliban.”125 Diplomatic 
ties between the Taliban and Riyadh were curtailed but remained until September 2001.126 
Covertly, through the ISI, Riyadh continued to fund the Taliban until 2001. 
In 2001, as the Taliban’s regime collapsed, Riyadh reset its official relations with Kabul. 
Riyadh supported the interim regime in Kabul led by Karzai. Since then, Riyadh has officially 
supported every regime in Kabul. However, Riyadh’s policy on Afghanistan continues to be 
conducted vis-à-vis Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. As a result of this, Riyadh covertly 
supports the Taliban while maintaining its official ties with Kabul.  
 
             Saudi Arabia’s role in the current Afghan conflict (2001-Present) 
 
In my article, “Pakistan and Iran Keep Fueling Taliban Terror Tactics” in the National 
Interest, I noted that currently, “Riyadh’s support for the Taliban is rooted in its special 
relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is a key ally and strategic partner of Riyadh in the region. 
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Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a writer for Arab News,  defines the relationship between Riyadh and 
Islamabad as ‘a vast and dynamic web of cooperative linkages, age-old bonds of friendship and 
undertakings, dating from well before the establishment of diplomatic relations and growing 
continuously year-on-year.’127 Similarly, Bruce Riedel, an expert on South Asia,  notes that 
‘The Saudi kingdom has a longstanding and intimate relationship with Pakistan . . . They have 
had a deep strategic military relationship for decades.’128 Both Riyadh and Islamabad are key 
actors in advancing each others’ core foreign policy goals. To demonstrate: In February, 
Pakistan committed nearly one thousand troops to Saudi Arabia as Riyadh blocked 
Washington's efforts to list Pakistan on an international terror-financing watch list.”129 As 
Pakistan continues to use the Taliban as an asset, Riyadh as Pakistan’s strategic ally, will 
continue to support the Taliban.  
In that regard, as Riyadh supports Pakistan’s strategic policies, Islamabad also supports 
Riyadh’s foreign policy goals. On November 26, 2017, Riyadh launched the Islamic Counter-
Terrorism Coalition. The counter-terrorism coalition is not only designed to counter Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards but it’s also a pillar of Riyadh’s foreign policy.130 Pakistan is a key 
supporter of this coalition. Given Riyadh’s special relationship with Islamabad, not 
surprisingly, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Counter-Terrorism Coalition is Raheel 
Sharif, Pakistan’s former chief of army staff. In that light, as Saudi Arabia seeks to strengthen 
its partnership with Islamabad to increase its militaristic capabilities and to strengthen the 
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Islamic Counter-Terrorism Coalition, Riyadh will continue to support Pakistan’s pro-Taliban 
policy.  
Furthermore, the Saudi’s financial support to the Taliban remains an open secret.131 In 
2005 and subsequently, Riyadh increased its financial support to the Taliban at Pakistan’s 
request. A Saudi intelligence officer told the Afghanistan Times, a local Afghan news agency, 
that “When Taliban with the help of Pakistan asked us for financial support for their war against 
the government of Afghanistan...we accepted to help them without any hesitance.” 132 Likewise, 
Saudi officials turn a blind eye when the Taliban are collecting funds under their watch in Saudi 
Arabia. In 2009, American officials complained that the Taliban were raising millions of dollars 
in Saudi Arabia to support its insurgency.133  
Carlotta Gall, an expert on Afghanistan, noted that “Despite those covert efforts, the 
Saudi kingdom, publicly and officially, has been largely absent in Afghanistan. While paying 
lip service to the American mission, Saudi Arabia has not built a significant project in its own 
name in Afghanistan in 15 years.”134  Although Riyadh has official ties with the government in 
Kabul, its interaction with Kabul is very limited. Rather, its covert role in the Afghan war has 
significantly impacted the conflict.  
In the current phase of the conflict in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is a third-party actor, 
facilitating the financial expenses of the Taliban. Although the Taliban is no longer an anti-Shia 
group that Riyadh cultivated it to be, Riyadh continues to support the Taliban due to its special 
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bilateral relationship with Pakistan. Given Riyadh’s strategic partnership with Islamabad, Saudi 
Arabia is likely to continue to exacerbate the war by lending its support to the Taliban.  
 
                                   Addressing the counter-argument 
 
Recently, political analysts of the war in Afghanistan argue that Riyadh has shifted its 
policy on Afghanistan. Analysts argue that Riyadh no longer supports the Taliban based on two 
instances. Firstly, analysts state that Riyadh’s condemnation of Qatar’s role in Afghanistan 
signals a shift in Riyadh’s policy on Afghanistan. Secondly, analysts argue that Riyadh’s 
initiation to host an ulema conference on Afghanistan depicts Riyadh’s support for stability in 
Afghanistan. However, both of these interpretations are misleading.  
Last year, in an event in Kabul, Mishari al-Harbi, a senior Saudi diplomat, said that 
“Qatar has harbored leaders of a number of terrorist groups and it is backing terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan.” 135Analysts assume that al-Harbi was referring to the Taliban although he never 
explicitly identified the Taliban as a terrorist group. Secondly, if al-Harbi was referring to the 
Taliban, his rhetoric still doesn’t indicate a shift in Saudi’s policy. Rather, Riyadh’s 
condemnation of Qatar’s pro-Taliban policy is rooted in its rivalry with Qatar. In the National 
Interest, I’ve noted that “Riyadh’s tough stance on Qatar is due to its competition with Doha as 
both states seek to exert greater influence in the Middle East and North Africa.” 136 Saudi 
Arabia’s commendation of Qatar is a convenient strategy employed by Riyadh to undermine its 
rival’s credibility as a responsible state.  
                                                
135 Shadi Khan Saif, “Saudi envoy criticizes Qatari backing of Afghan Taliban,” ( Ankara, Anadolu Agency, 
2017).  
136 Azizi, “Pakistan and Iran Keep Fueling Taliban.”	  
Azizi	  49	  
	  
	   	  
 Moreover, on July 2018, Riyadh collaborated with the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) to convene a two-day conference on peace and stability in Afghanistan.137 
Analysts interpreted the conference hosted by Saudi Arabia as evidence that Saudi Arabia 
condemns the Taliban and supports peace in Afghanistan. However, the declaration adopted at 
the conference indicates that Riyadh continues to support the Taliban. In the conference, Riyadh 
failed to identify the Taliban’s role in the war in Afghanistan. Riyadh didn’t acknowledge that 
the Taliban is the major destabilizing factor in Afghanistan. Rather, the main message conveyed 
in the conference was that Kabul and the Taliban should make peace. Riyadh’s message is 
simply lip-service that is also reiterated by other regional sponsors of the Taliban. An indication 
of a true change in Riyadh’s policy would be Riyadh’s acknowledgment and denouncement of 




            History of Afghanistan-Russia relations 
 
The 1950s marked the beginning of strengthened ties between Moscow and Kabul.138 
Under Mohammad Daud’s leadership, Afghanistan’s prime minister, he initiated a series of rapid 
developmental plans that required large sums of money in the form of foreign aid.139 Afghanistan’s 
northern neighbor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), provided Daud with the 
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assistance that he sought to fulfill his developmental ambitions. Along with Soviet aid, thousands 
of Soviet advisors trickled into Afghanistan. From 1954-1967, Afghanistan received the third most 
Soviet aid to developing countries. 140  
On October 1, 1964, despite Afghanistan’s political transition to a constitutional monarchy, 
Moscow maintained strong ties with the political elites in Kabul. As Daud lost his power, Moscow 
strengthened its ties with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). With Moscow’s 
support, the PDPA became a strong political force during Afghanistan’s experiment with 
democracy.  
However, Afghanistan’s period of liberalization came to an end in 1973 when Daud 
overthrew the regime in Kabul. During Daud’s reign as the first president of the Republic of 
Afghanistan, the strong bilateral relationship between Moscow and Kabul not only resumed but 
intensified for the first two years of his reign. In 1975, Daud revamped his government. He 
outlawed every political party, including the Soviet-backed PDPA, except for his own party, 
National Revolutionary Party. Much to the dismay of the Soviets, Daud also purged key members 
of the PDPA within his government and reverted to Afghanistan’s traditional policy of genuine 
neutrality. Daud shifted his foreign policy from one that favored strong relations with Moscow at 
the cost of distancing his regime from the western states to one that favored friendly relations with 
both the West and Moscow. As a result of this foreign policy shift, Daud welcomed western 
advisors to various provinces in Afghanistan, including the northern provinces. The presence of 
western advisors in Afghanistan’s northern provinces agitated the members of the Soviet Politburo. 
In 1977, the Politburo, worried of western influence near its border, invited Daud to Moscow. 
During Daud’s trip to Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev requested Daud to get rid of the Western experts 
                                                




	   	  
in the northern provinces. In Khaama Press, an Afghan news agency, I noted that, “Daud viewed 
Brezhnev’s request as an interference in Afghanistan’s affairs.  He refused and said, ‘Afghanistan 
shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decision.’ He ended the meeting abruptly 
and said, ‘We will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in 
Afghanistan…After that meeting, Moscow united the two bitter factions of the…[PDPA]… in 
preparation for the coup against Daud. On April 28, 1978, Soviet planes flew over Arg, the Afghan 
presidential palace. The Soviets bombarded the presidential palace and overthrew Daud’s regime. 
Subsequently, Moscow installed Nur Mohammad Taraki as the president of Afghanistan.”141 
During Taraki’s reign, Moscow’s relationship with Kabul deepened significantly. 142 
Taraki not only brought Afghanistan into the Soviet bloc but Afghanistan also became the Soviet’s 
client state. However, Moscow’s warm relations with Kabul was short-lived. On October 8, 1979, 
Taraki was assassinated as a result of deepened internal rifts between members of the PDPA. 
Subsequently, Hafizullah Amin succeeded Taraki. However, the Soviets were skeptical of Amin. 
Moscow claimed that he was a CIA agent.143 Although Moscow continued maintaining official 
ties with Amin’s regime, Amin’s reign over Kabul made the Politburo uneasy. As a result, on 
December 25, 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and assassinated Amin two days later. 
Moscow’s invasion had two purposes, to overthrow Amin’s regime and to regain its grip and 
influence over Kabul.   
Shortly after the Soviet-led coup against Amin, Babrak Karmal was installed as the 
succeeding president of Afghanistan. On December 27,1979, at 8 p.m. Karmal announced himself 
as the president of Afghanistan from a radio station in Tajikistan. Karmal’s installation coincided 
                                                
141 Azizi, “The Tragedy of Russian Politics.”  
142 Riedel, What We Won, 17-19. 
143 William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, (Monroe, Common 
Courage Press, 343).  
Azizi	  52	  
	  
	   	  
with an increase of popular resistance and resentment against the regime in Kabul and the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. Due to the local’s increased opposition against the Soviet’s presence, 
Moscow assisted the Afghan regime to suppress the opposition until 1989.  
After a decade of war, on February 15, 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. In 
Kabul, the Moscow-backed Mohammad Najibullah presided over the Arg. Najibullah remained in 
power until 1992. Although Najibullah’s government was plagued with internal rifts, Moscow’s 
dwindling support to him led to the demise of his regime. In 1992, as the Soviet Union dissolved, 
Moscow was no longer interested in backing Najibullah’s government. As Moscow was 
undergoing a political transformation, Boris Yeltsin was not only the first president of the Russian 
Federation but he also represented a new hope for Russia. According to the L.A. Times, Yeltsin, 
“Was one of the harshest critics of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and then of the continuing 
aid.”144 Moscow was ready to move on and heal itself from its “bleeding wound” by distancing 
itself from Kabul.  
Moscow’s relationship with the Afghan government intensified once again in 1996. As the 
Taliban’s insurgency was seizing large chunks of Afghanistan’s territory, Moscow assisted the 
official government of Afghanistan led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Through Tajikistan, Moscow 
sent aid to Ahmad Shah Massoud, a key figure in Rabbani’s government and in the UIFSA. During 
the 1990s, Moscow was wary of the Taliban’s encroachment of Afghanistan. Moscow was worried 
that the Taliban’s insurgency would have a spillover effect and incite similar movements in its 
backyard, Central Asia. Moscow remained a key supporter of the Rabbani’s government until 
2001. 
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On October 7th, 2001, due to the September 11th attacks, the United States initiated its 
campaign against the Taliban’s regime. Moscow supported Washington’s mission of overthrowing 
the Taliban. Subsequent to the demise of the Taliban’s regime, an interim government led by 
Hamid Karzai took power. Since Karzai’s regime, Moscow has remained official ties with the 
governments in Kabul.  
However, Moscow’s initial enthusiasm for Washington’s presence in Afghanistan was 
short-lived. As the Taliban regained its strength and as the war in Afghanistan intensified, Moscow 
became anxious of Washington’s continued presence in the region. As a result of this agitation, 
Moscow cultivated covert ties with the Taliban while maintaining its official ties with Kabul.  
                               
Russia’s role in the current Afghan conflict (2001-Present) 
 
Moscow’s relationship with Kabul declined in 2004. Nearly three years after eagerly 
embracing the Afghan interim government, as Moscow’s relations with the West deteriorated over 
Ukraine, Moscow became uneasy of Washington’s presence in Afghanistan. In 2006, Moscow 
halted all military aid to Kabul.  
However, by 2009, Karzai’s relationship with Washington was severely strained because 
he distrusted Washington, often accusing it of working against him. 145 As a result of Karzai’s 
paranoia, he warmed up to other governments. Karzai reset his relationship with Moscow by 
initiating contact with the Kremlin.  In 2010, Moscow resumed its developmental and military aid 
to Afghanistan. 146 Russia’s ties with Kabul steadily increased as a result of continued diplomatic 
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interactions between the two governments. The relationship between Kabul and Moscow was 
moving towards a path of increased cooperation until the succeeding Afghan government steered 
away from Karzai’s foreign policy.  
In 2015, reports first emerged of Moscow’s contact with the Taliban. Moscow claimed that 
its contact with the Taliban is due to the presence of ISKP in Afghanistan.  Although Afghan 
officials concluded that the Taliban and ISKP are the same group merely operating under a 
different banner, Russia considers ISKP a threat not only to its security but to the security its allies 
in the Central Asian republics. In an article that I’ve written for Khaama Press, I’ve noted that, “in 
2015, Russia publically announced that it has ties with the Taliban. Maria Zakharova, a 
spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said that the contact between Moscow and the 
Taliban is for intelligence-sharing and information exchange regarding the fight against 
ISIS…[The] Russian ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander Mantytskiy, told the Afghan 
parliament that Russia and the Taliban have a shared interest in fighting ISIS.147 According to 
Mantytskiy, ISIS wants to use the Northern provinces of Afghanistan as a starting point to expand 
its influence to Russia.148 Although the U.S. backed Afghan government is a much larger force 
that is fighting [ISKP] , Moscow isn’t cooperating with Kabul to fight [ISKP]. Should Russia 
consider [ISKP] a threat, it would be more suitable to cooperate with [the] stronger force, the 
Afghan government, and not the Taliban.”149 
However, Russia prefers to cooperate with the Taliban rather than the Afghan government 
to counter ISKP. A senior Afghan official told the New York Times on the condition of 
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anonymity  that, “Bilaterally, we have struggled to convince the Russians on certain issues because 
they increasingly see us only as part of this larger game with the United States.”150 I’ve stated in 
Khaama Press that, “Russia refuses to cooperate with the Afghan government’s counterterrorism 
efforts because it’s backed by Washington.”  
Secondly, Moscow’s support for the Taliban relies heavily on its relationship with 
Washington. In my article, “The Tragedy of Russian Politics in Afghanistan” in Khaama Press, I 
noted that “Russia’s support for the Taliban stems from its fear of the U.S., its traditional rival, 
exerting greater influence in the region.  Moscow [arms] the Taliban to counter and challenge the 
United States’ influence and efforts in Afghanistan…. [To this end, in 2016, Russia] announced 
its decision to not cooperate with the U.S. mission in Afghanistan… Zamir Kabulov, Putin’s 
special envoy to Afghanistan, iterated that, ‘honestly speaking, we’re already tired of joining 
anything Washington starts…We won’t join the useless events, and we’ve already told the 
Americans.’151 Kabulov also called the American bases in Afghanistan disturbing and intolerable. 
In an interview with Anadolu Agency, a Turkish state-run news agency, he said ‘Of course; why 
should it not be disturbing for anybody? Why in Afghanistan? Where is Afghanistan and where is 
America!? If we did something like that in Mexico, would it not be disturbing for America? In 
Cuba, we have already experienced and we know the outcome. I think it is old fashioned. Why are 
they doing that after all this 15-year-old anti-terror rhetoric in Afghanistan? They stupidly try to 
say that it is for training. Come on! You are not talking to stupid or foolish people. We know the 
reasons [for the ongoing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan]. Russia will never tolerate 
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this.’”152 Moscow arms the Taliban to raise the costs of the war for Washington by strengthening 
the Taliban’s offensive capabilities.  
In Khaama Press, I’ve also observed that “Although Moscow denies arming the Taliban, 
there is mounting evidence that proves otherwise. Moscow has been supporting the Taliban in 
contested provinces.153 Ghulam Farooq Sangari, the police chief of Uruzgan province, told Voice 
of America that, ‘Eleven Russians, including two women, dressed in doctor’s uniforms and 
guarded by four armed Taliban, along with an Afghan translator, have been spotted in various parts 
of the province… they have been enticing people against the government, providing training and 
teaching how to assemble land mines.’ Similarly, in Kunduz, another highly contested province, 
Afghan security officials told 1TVNews, a local Afghan news agency, that ‘Russia provides 
weapons and military equipment for Taliban fighters in Dasht-e-Archi, Imam Sahib, Qalai Zal and 
Kalbat districts of Kunduz province via Tajikistan.’154 In Helmand, another volatile province, 
Moscow provided the Taliban with a mobile clinic to treat its injured fighters. In Farah province, 
security officials said that Russian weapons and night vision binoculars contributed to the fall of 
13 security posts to the Taliban.” 155 
Russia has also given the Taliban political support. Moscow acknowledges the Taliban as 
a credible security provider rather than the government in Kabul. Mantytskiy confirmed that 
Russia has “ Ties to the Taliban to ensure the security of our political offices, consulates, and the 
security of Central Asia.”156 His statement not only weakens the Afghan government’s credibility 
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as a legitimate security provider but also suggests that Moscow has made an agreement with the 
Taliban to ensure the security of its offices.  
Furthermore, Moscow is keen on maintaining its diplomatic interactions with the Taliban. 
Moscow planned to hold official peace-talks with the Taliban led by Russia on September 4th 2018 
without Kabul’s cooperation. Sebghatullah Ahmadi, a spokesman for the Afghan government told 
Deutsche Welle that “A peace process can only be initiated and brought forward by the Afghan 
government." 157 Kabul’s displeasure at Russia’s diplomatic gesture led Moscow to postpone the 
talks. However, Russia hasn’t signaled its abandonment of the Taliban and will likely continue to 
support the Taliban.   
Much to the dismay of the Afghan government, Russia arms the Taliban to counter ISKP 
and the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan. Russia, like China and Iran, is a third-party actor 
that is prolonging the current conflict in Afghanistan. Like China, Russia’s role in in the current 
conflict is limited to arming the Taliban and occasionally lending it political support.158 Russia as 
a third-party actor, intervenes in the war by strengthening the Taliban to advance its own interests 
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On January 20, 1955, the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Afghanistan 
established diplomatic relations. The relationship between both countries were cordial as China 
sought to bolster its economic ties with Afghanistan. However, in the 1960s, as Pakistan’s 
relationship with Afghanistan soured, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was closed. The closure of 
the border hindered the fruition of the economic relations between Kabul and Beijing.  
However, in 1964, the political landscape in Afghanistan changed significantly. Free 
speech and political parties were legalized by the regime in Kabul as Afghanistan was going 
through a period of modernization. Regional powers utilized this opportunity to establish proxy 
networks in Afghanistan. To that end, China funded the Shola-e-Jawid party, a political party 
sympathetic to the ideas of Mao Zedong.  
In 1973, as Afghanistan’s period of modernization came to an end, Kabul’s diplomatic ties 
with Beijing declined as Kabul sought closer ties with Moscow, Beijing’s rival. As per Moscow’s 
request, the Afghan government banned the Shola-e-Jawid party and further alienated Beijing. 
However, Beijing remained in contact with the Shola-e-Jawid party as the party transformed in to 
an underground movement. 
Nearly five years later, in 1978, as the Soviet Union installed Taraki in power, the Soviet-
backed government in Kabul became hostile to China. As a result, Beijing encouraged the Shola-
e-Jawid party to engage in subversive activities. However, as the Shola-e-Jawid party weakened, 
China shifted most of its resources to assisting the Mujahideen’s resistance of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan.  
During the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan, Beijing’s ties with Kabul strengthened 
unprecedentedly. Beijing sought an amicable relationship with the Taliban. As a result, the Taliban 
pledged to shut down the Uighar militant training camps in Afghanistan. In November 2000, Lu 
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Shunlin, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, was the first government official from a non-Muslim 
country to secretly meet with Mullah Omar.159  Due to China’s friendly relationship with the 
Taliban, Mullah Omar promised that he would never allow the Uighar militants to use 
Afghanistan’s territory to plan and launched attacks against China. Moreover, according to Anders 
Corr, an expert on terrorism, “In the late 1990s, China promised to support the Taliban 
diplomatically at the U.N. in exchange for assistance against Afghan extremists targeting Chinese 
interests.”  
Furthermore, during the Taliban’s reign, China was economically invested in Afghanistan. 
The Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan marked the first time in Sino-Afghan relations that a large 
Chinese company invested in Afghanistan. The Washington Times reported that Zhongxing 
Telecom (ZTE) and Huawei Technologies, two Chinese companies, operated in Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan.  
However, in 2001, the Taliban’s regime was toppled. As the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan was established, Hamid Karzai was announced as the head of the government in 
Kabul. The following year, in 2002, China re-established its officials ties with Kabul. 
 
                   China’s role in the current Afghan conflict (2001-Present) 
 
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, China’s official ties with 
Kabul is mainly economical. As the Chinese Communist Party derives its domestic legitimacy 
from economic growth, China is keen on expanding its economic outreach. In Afghanistan, China 
is the third largest trading partner. According to Corr, “Chinese companies, including MCC, Zijin 
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Mining Group Company, China National Petroleum Corporation, and Jiangxi Copper Corporation, 
are seeking to extract billions in minerals from Afghanistan.”160 Beijing has invested in various 
economic projects in Afghanistan. Most prominently, China has invested in Mes Aynak, the largest 
foreign investment project in Afghanistan’s history.  
Mes Aynak is the second largest copper deposit on Earth. In November 2007, Kabul 
granted a 30-year lease for the Mes Aynak site to Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) and 
Jiangxi Copper, Ltd, (JCL), two Chinese state-owned companies. China, one of the largest 
importers of copper will greatly benefit from this project. Experts estimated that China’s profit 
from the Mes Aynak project will far exceed its initial $3 billion investment.  
Although the project is delayed due to logistical issues related to the contract, a security 
guarantor is required to advance the work of the project should the logistical issues resolve. 161 
Mes Aynak is located in Logar, a remote and volatile province. It is a province that frequently 
comes under the Taliban’s attack. Beijing understands that Taliban is not only a reality in 
Afghanistan but also a real force that could potentially harm its economic interests. Therefore, 
China maintains cordial ties with the Taliban while maintaining friendly ties with Kabul. For 
China, it’s more convenient to work with the Taliban to pursue its economic goals instead of 
resisting against it. Due to the cordial relationship between the Taliban and China, the Taliban has 
given China the green light to proceed with the developments of the project. In 2016, the Taliban 
announced that they are committed to protecting the Mes Aynak project along with other projects 
that benefit states that have cordial ties with the Taliban. 162 
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The Taliban’s support for China in Logar province has led to Chinese support for the 
Taliban in other volatile provinces. In 2016, Abdul Jabar Qahraman, the chief commander in 
Helmand province, said that “All say China is innocent, but all explosives to Taliban come from 
China. Taliban’s laser and heavy weapons proves that China is involved.”163 
China, as a third party actor in the current conflict, not only supplies the Taliban with 
weapons but, it also supports the Taliban politically. 164 China’s political support for the Taliban 
is due to its all-weather friendship with Pakistan.165 Islamabad is heavily invested in the Taliban 
to further its interests in Afghanistan and the region. Therefore, China as a reliable ally of Pakistan, 
supports Islamabad’s pro-Taliban policy.  
China supports Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy on the international level. Last year, 
Mahmoud Saikal, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the U.N., called on China to use its influence to 
deter Pakistan from harboring terrorist groups that pose an existential threat to Afghanistan.  
However, China hasn’t convinced Pakistan to change its policy of supporting the Taliban. Rather, 
China supports Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy.  In September 2017, at the BRICS Summit, 
Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, called Pakistan the “mother ship of terrorism” and said 
that “This country shelters not just terrorists. It nurtures a mindset. A mindset that loudly proclaims 
that terrorism is justified for political gains.”  However, China immediately responded to Modi’s 
remarks and rejected India’s claim. Instead, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry, rejected Mr. Modi’s statement and said that China “Is against linking any country or 
religion with terror and asked the world community to acknowledge Pakistan’s great sacrifices.” 
Contrary to China’s statement, not only is there an increase of consensus amongst members of the 
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international community that Pakistan has an over-arching role in the Taliban’s insurgency, but 
Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s former foreign minister’s, acknowledged the influence that Pakistan has 
over the Taliban. China’s refusal to acknowledge Pakistan’s intimate links with groups like the 
Taliban signals China’s support for Pakistan’s policies.166 Moreover, China’s support for the 
Taliban on the international level led it to advocate for the removal of the Taliban’s leaders from 
the United Nations Security Council’s sanction list. Similar to Beijing’s diplomatic support to the 
Taliban in 1990s, China still plays an active role in the council by resisting the placement of the 
Taliban’s top leaders in the United Nations Security Council’s sanction list.167  
Furthermore, China’s support for Pakistan’s pro-terrorism policy isn’t only due to its 
alliance with Pakistan, it’s also strategic. Beijing’s support for Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy stems 
from its desire to pursue its own economic interest in the region. As history has shown, any 
economic activity between Kabul and Beijing can only happen when Pakistan’s border is open.  
China understands that like in the 1950’s if Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan deteriorates, 
China needs to maintain its friendly ties with Pakistan to not only discourage it from closing its 
border with Afghanistan, but to also expand its economic outreach westwards. China is compelled 
to appease Pakistan by supporting its pro-Taliban policy due its own geostrategic interests.   
 Corr noted in the Forbes that, “In China’s Faustian bargaining with the Taliban, China 
increases the Taliban’s diplomatic profile and…appears to have strengthened and re-focused 
Taliban violence ever more tightly” at the cost of weakening Kabul’s credibility.168 The Taliban’s 
periodic visits to China has angered the Afghan government.  According to Voice of America  
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( VOA), “The Afghan government has shown its displeasure over reports that a Taliban delegation 
visited China, saying Beijing should not provide a platform to groups that are involved in the 
killing of Afghans.”169 Despite Kabul’s dismay, Beijing will continue to maintain its official ties 
with Kabul while strengthening its covert ties with the Taliban to further advance its economic and 
geostrategic interests.  
 
Recommendations: Afghanistan’s Way Forward 
 
 In the 1990s, as Afghanistan was in 5th phase of the conflict, Lakhdar Brahimi, United 
Nations Special Envoy for Afghanistan from 1997-1999, reported to the United Nations that in 
order to end the conflict in Afghanistan, there should be greater international pressure on 
Afghanistan’s neighbors to cease aiding the Taliban.170 In the current phase of the conflict in 
Afghanistan, regional sponsorship of the Taliban play a crucial role in strengthening the Taliban’s 
insurgency, hindering the stability of Afghanistan, and lengthening the war. In Afghanistan’s 
current political theater, the Afghan government along with the international community is seeking 
to end the conflict by inducing the Taliban to enter peace-talks with Kabul.  
 In David E. Cunningham’s study, “Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace 
Processes in Civil War,”  he demonstrated that successful peace-talks include the participation of 
veto players and the absence of non-veto players. Since, veto-players have the ability to unilaterally 
run a war, their approval in a negotiated settlement is required to bring lasting peace.171 The 
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absence of non-veto players is necessary in peace-talks because their participation reduces the 
chances of reaching a negotiated settlement. This is so because an increase in the number of actors 
would require further negotiations on addtional interests that are at stake, thereby reducing the 
probability of reaching a settlement.  
   In the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan is a veto-player. Pakistan’s participation is required in 
the peace-talks to end the war in Afghanistan. Although, the Taliban is the main actor fueling 
instability in Afghanistan, the Taliban isn’t a veto player. The Taliban doesn’t have the ability to 
unilaterally run its insurgency. The Taliban, a group that lacks popular support, is very dependent 
on the sponsorship of regional players to continue its insurgency. Not only does Pakistan’s ISI 
play an indispensable role in the Taliban’s military operations but Pakistan also garners fighters to 
strengthen the Taliban’s insurgency.172 Without Pakistan’s support the Taliban are incapable of 
running its insurgency.173 With or without the support of the Taliban’s leader, the Taliban’s 
insurgency flourishes due to Islamabad’s support. Mullah Rahmatullah Kakazada, a key member 
of the Taliban admitted the group’s dependency to the Guardian, stating that, “If we left Pakistan 
we would not survive one week.” The Taliban’s insurgency would dismantle in a very short-span 
of time without Islamabad’s support. Therefore, successful peace-talks require the participation of 
Pakistan, not the Taliban.174  
 Furthermore, Washington and the international community has mainly expended most of 
its resources on improving the counter-terrorism capabilities of the Afghan Armed Forces. While 
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the defensive and counter-terrorism capabilities of the Afghan government have inflicted damages 
to the Taliban, it hasn’t crushed the Taliban’s insurgency nor has it discouraged regional players 
from supporting the Taliban. To end the war, the international community and Washington should 
place greater focus on the sponsorship of the Taliban by regional players. Washington and the 
international community should raise the costs for regional players that pursue a pro-Taliban 
policy. Through a carrot and stick approach that is catered to addressing the different interests of 
these regional players, the international community and Washington could raise the incentive for 




The current intrastate conflict in Afghanistan is multifaceted. Domestic and external 
factors are attributed to the war. Although there are multiple parties involved in the war, this 
paper examines the destabilizing role that regional states from the Asian continent play in the 
Afghan war.  
While there are many reasons why external states intervene in a conflict, the war in 
Afghanistan confirms not only Cunningham’s, Lindsay’s, and Enterline’s study, but it also 
confirms the overall realist notion that external states intervene in a conflict on the basis of 
interests. External states calculate the costs and benefits of their intervention to advance its 
respective national interests. While the discussed regional states play a devastating role in the 
Afghan war, these regional players continue their destabilizing role due to strategic 
calculations based on the costs and benefits of fueling the conflict by supporting the Taliban.  
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As a weak actor, the Taliban is highly dependent on regional players to sustain its 
insurgency. By using the five regional states as case studies, this paper examines the role that 
Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China play in the war in Afghanistan. These case 
studies confirm the notion that the intervention of external states exacerbate a conflict. This 
study confirms my hypothesis that the support of regional states to the Taliban is the fueling and 
lengthening the war in Afghanistan. These regional states deem it in their interests to support the 
Taliban. 
 The case study on Pakistan proves that in the Afghan war, Pakistan is a veto-player. 
Pakistan as a veto player, has significant interests to fuel the Taliban’s insurgency. In 
confirmation with the findings of Cunningham (2006), Pakistan’s status as a veto-player that 
supports the Taliban’s war efforts, is a key factor that is hindering peace in Afghanistan. Also, 
this paper confirms the study of Cunningham (2010). Pakistan’s intervention in the war in 
Afghanistan is to pursue its own agenda that is mainly irrelevant to the goals of the internal 
fighting Afghan parties. Cunningham’s study proves that the pursue of a separate agenda by an 
external state greatly increases the duration of an intrastate conflict. Likewise, Pakistan’s 
sponsorship of the Taliban is aligned with its own interests in Afghanistan that is irrelevant to the 
agenda of the domestic Afghan actors. Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy has led to the lengthening 
of the war in Afghanistan.  
Moreover, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China are third-party actors that utilize the 
momentum of the Taliban’s insurgency ignited by Pakistan to further their own interests. 
Although these countries’ roles aren’t as extensive as Pakistan’s role, these countries still play a 
significant role in the conflict. The involvement of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China in 
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Afghanistan confirms the study of Regan (2002): third party interventions tend to increase the 
duration of intrastate conflict Regan.  
Furthermore, the assistance that Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China provide to the 
Taliban confirms Lindsay’s and Enterline’s finding that third-party actors intervene in a conflict 
to advance their own respective interests (Lindsay and Enterline 2002). According to Lindsay 
and Enterline, such intervention, on the basis of interests, extends the duration of an intrastate 
conflict. In Afghanistan, third-party intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China has 
led to the intensification of the war.  
These regional states support the Taliban because it’s an easier means to attain their 
respective interests. In other words, regional sponsorship of the Taliban is not a costly policy for 
these regional states. This paper confirms Salehyan’s finding that, external states support rebel 
groups because its less costly than directly engaging with its rival (Salehyan 2011).  
Given the interests that regional states have in supporting the Taliban, it’s very unlikely 
that these states will abandon its support for the Taliban. In that light, the preliminary steps 
towards ending the war in Afghanistan requires regional abandonment of the Taliban. To reach 
this end, regional players need to be induced to abandon the Taliban.  
To end the conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s presence as a veto-player is required in 
the peace-talks. Moreover, to reduce the destabilizing role that regional states play in the war, 
the international community needs to make it costly for regional players to pursue a 
pro-Taliban policy. Otherwise, the international community’s current approach, mainly 
dedicated to improving the counter-terrorism capabilities of the Afghan government will not 
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